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Non-manipulable Ass...
Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited
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- Andersson, Tommy (författare)
- Lund University,Lunds universitet,Nationalekonomiska institutionen,Ekonomihögskolan,Department of Economics,Lund University School of Economics and Management, LUSEM
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- Svensson, Lars-Gunnar (författare)
- Lund University,Lunds universitet,Nationalekonomiska institutionen,Ekonomihögskolan,Department of Economics,Lund University School of Economics and Management, LUSEM
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(creator_code:org_t)
- 2006
- Engelska.
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Serie: Working Papers, Department of Economics, Lund University
- Relaterad länk:
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Abstract
Ämnesord
Stäng
- This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof.
Ämnesord
- SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP -- Ekonomi och näringsliv -- Nationalekonomi (hsv//swe)
- SOCIAL SCIENCES -- Economics and Business -- Economics (hsv//eng)
Nyckelord
- Indivisible objects
- fairness
- coalitionally strat
Publikations- och innehållstyp
- ovr (ämneskategori)
- vet (ämneskategori)