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Weakly Fair Allocat...
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Andersson, TommyLund University,Lunds universitet,Nationalekonomiska institutionen,Ekonomihögskolan,Department of Economics,Lund University School of Economics and Management, LUSEM
(författare)
Weakly Fair Allocations and Strategy-Proofness
- Artikel/kapitelEngelska2008
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LIBRIS-ID:oai:lup.lub.lu.se:7ff8fdaa-33e8-4534-8f62-94ca302cb4d0
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https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1385257URI
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Språk:engelska
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Sammanfattning på:engelska
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This paper investigates the problem of allocating two types of indivisible objects among a group of agents when a priority-order must be respected and only restricted monetary transfers are allowed. Since the existence of a fair (as in envy-free) allocation is not generally guaranteed, due to the restrictions on the money transfers, the concept of fairness is weakened, and a new concept of fairness is introduced. This concept is called weak fairness. This paper defines an allocation rule that implements weakly fair allocations and demonstrates that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. In fact, under a mild regulatory condition and quasi-linear utility functions, it is demonstrated that this is the only coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rule that implements a weakly fair allocation.
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Nationalekonomiska institutionenEkonomihögskolan
(creator_code:org_t)
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Ingår i:Review of Economic Design11, s. 321-3381434-4742
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