| 1. |
- Barrett, S., et al.
(författare)
-
The Decision to Link Trade Agreements to the Supply of Global Public Goods
- 2022
-
Ingår i: Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - : University of Chicago Press. - 2333-5955 .- 2333-5963. ; 9:2, s. 273-305
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We use simple theory and an experiment to investigate the decision to link trade cooperation to the provision of a global public good like climate change mitigation. We examine and compare a unilateral approach, in which players decide independently and without commitment, and a multilateral approach, in which players decide by, and are committed through, an agreement. Our theory shows that, if players decide to link unilaterally, in a best case linkage is a coordination game in which equilibrium selection is unreliable. By contrast, if players decide to link multilaterally, selection in this best case is assured by specifying an appropriate participation threshold for the linked agreement to enter into force. Our experimental results confirm the superiority of the multilateral approach and reveal additionally that agreement by a majority coupled with commitment by this majority are required for its success.
|
|
| 2. |
- Blackman, Allen, et al.
(författare)
-
A Contingent Valuation Approach to Estimating Regulatory Costs: Mexico’s Day without Driving Program
- 2018
-
Ingår i: Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - : University of Chicago Press. - 2333-5955 .- 2333-5963. ; 5:3, s. 607-641
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Little is known about the cost of environmental regulations that target households instead of firms, partly because of significant methodological and data challenges. We use the contingent valuation method to measure the costs of Mexico City’s Day without Driving program, which seeks to stem pollution and traffic congestion by prohibiting vehicles from being driven one day each week. To our knowledge, ours is the first study to focus directly on using stated preference methods to isolate and estimate the private costs ofan existing environmental regulation. We find that the Mexican program’s costs are substantial: up to US$130 per vehicle per year, which represents 1%–2% ofdrivers’ annual income and implies total costs ofUS$617 million per year. Recent research questions whether driving restrictions programs like Mexico City’s actually have environmental benefits. Our results suggest that whatever benefits these programs may have, they can be quite costly.
|
|
| 3. |
- Forslid, Rikard, et al.
(författare)
-
Trade Liberalization, Transboundary Pollution, and Market Size
- 2017
-
Ingår i: Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - : University of Chicago Press. - 2333-5955 .- 2333-5963. ; 4:3, s. 927-957
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper uses a monopolistic competitive framework to study the impact of trade liberalization on local and global emissions. We focus on the interplay of asymmetric emission taxes and the home market effect and show how a large-market advantage can counterbalance a high emission tax, so that trade liberalization leads firms to move to the large high-tax economy. Global emissions decrease when trade is liberalized in this case. We then simulate the model with endogenous taxes. The larger country, which has the advantage of the home market effect, will be able to set a higher Nash emission tax than its smaller trade partner yet still maintain its manufacturing base. As a result, a pollution haven will typically not arise in this case as trade is liberalized. However, global emissions increase as a result of international tax competition, which underscores the importance of international cooperation as trade becomes freer.
|
|
| 4. |
- Gars, Johan, et al.
(författare)
-
Trade and the Risk of Renewable-Resource Collapse
- 2018
-
Ingår i: Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - : University of Chicago Press. - 2333-5955 .- 2333-5963. ; 5:1, s. 155-206
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Does international trade increase the risk of renewable-resource collapse? We show that the answer is affirmative if trade increases the variety of goods and the resource is harvested under open access. Then there is increased likelihood of collapse both as a steady-state outcome and following shocks to the stock. Two separate mechanisms underlie the results. (1) Trade gives resource harvesters access to new varieties of goods. To enable buying these goods, they exert more harvesting effort. (2) The resource constitutes a new variety for other countries, implying that the resource price increases with trade openness, especially when the stock is small, which makes the resource “exclusive.” Unlike in the existing literature, which predicts that trade cannot lead to collapse, each of our two mechanisms can cause collapse and they both increase the vulnerability to shocks. We present several examples of collapses that can plausibly be attributed to each of the mechanisms.
|
|
| 5. |
- Hart, Robert
(författare)
-
To Everything There Is a Season: Carbon Pricing, Research Subsidies, and the Transition to Fossil-Free Energy
- 2019
-
Ingår i: Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - : University of Chicago Press. - 2333-5955 .- 2333-5963. ; 6, s. 135-175
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We develop a climate policy model with directed technological change (DTC) in the energy sector. The model delivers both analytical and numerical results that give a clear understanding of the respective roles of research subsidies and emissions pricing. By contrast to existing models with DTC, ours is close in structure to recent integrated assessment models, leading to dramatically different results. Although clean-research subsidies are substantial initially, they subsequently decline whereas emissions taxes increase without bound. Furthermore, emissions taxes are far more important than research subsidies: in our baseline parameterization, a regulator unable to tax can only achieve 36% of potential benefits, whereas a regulator unable to subsidize can achieve 91% of potential benefits.
|
|
| 6. |
- Mideksa, Torben, et al.
(författare)
-
Prices versus Quantities across Jurisdictions
- 2019
-
Ingår i: Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - : UNIV CHICAGO PRESS. - 2333-5955 .- 2333-5963. ; 6:5, s. 883-891
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We extend the standard "prices versus quantities" framework for pollution control to cover multiple heterogeneous jurisdictions interacting strategically with each other. When multi-jurisdictional externalities are present and the uncertainties among jurisdictions are independent, the regulatory game exhibits a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. For any one jurisdiction, the equilibrium choice of instrument is given by the sign of the original prices versus quantities formula. Thus, it is an optimal strategy for a jurisdiction to choose a price instrument when the slope of its own marginal benefit is less than the slope of its own marginal cost and a quantity instrument when this condition is reversed. The result suggests that the original nonstrategic criterion for the comparative advantage of prices over quantities may have wider applicability to determining instrument choice in a noncooperative strategic environment.
|
|
| 7. |
- Robalino, J., et al.
(författare)
-
Heterogeneous Local Spillovers from Protected Areas in Costa Rica
- 2017
-
Ingår i: Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - : University of Chicago Press. - 2333-5955 .- 2333-5963. ; 4:3, s. 795-820
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Spillovers can significantly reduce or enhance the net effects of land-use policies, yet there exists little rigorous evidence concerning their magnitudes. We examine how Costa Rica's national parks affect deforestation in nearby areas. We find that average deforestation spillovers are not significant in 0-5 km and 5-10 km rings around the parks. However, this average blends multiple effects that are significant and that vary in magnitude across the landscape, yielding varied net impacts. We distinguish the locations with different net spillovers by their distances to roads and park entrances-both of which are of economic importance, given critical local roles for transport costs and tourism. We find large and statistically significant leakage close to roads but far from park entrances, which are areas with high agricultural returns and less influenced by tourism. We do not find leakage far from roads (lower agriculture returns) or close to park entrances (higher tourism returns). Finally, parks facing greater threats of deforestation show greater leakage.
|
|
