| 1. |
- Arrhenius, Gustaf, et al.
(author)
-
Etiska avvägningar i pandemitider
- 2021
-
In: I en tid av pandemi. - Stockholm : Expertgruppen för studier i offentlig ekonomi, Finansdepartementet. - 9789152500699 ; , s. 59-72
-
Book chapter (pop. science, debate, etc.)
|
|
| 2. |
|
|
| 3. |
|
|
| 4. |
|
|
| 5. |
|
|
| 6. |
- Bykvist, Krister, 1965-
(author)
-
Agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons
- 2018
-
In: The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. - Oxford : Oxford University Press. - 9780199657889 ; , s. 821-838
-
Book chapter (peer-reviewed)abstract
- The distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons, at least in its explicit form, is a fairly recent contribution to normative ethics. That the distinction is both well-defined and significant is often taken for granted in contemporary normative ethics. For example, it is supposed to help us characterize many aspects of common-sense morality, such as personal duties, and deontological restrictions or constraints. The main question of this chapter is whether there is a well-defined distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons that has this high level of significance. Is the distinction really “an extremely important one,” as Nagel said, or perhaps even one of “the greatest contributions of recent ethics,” as Tom Hurka suggests? A variety of accounts of this distinction is discussed and it is argued that none live up to this hype, at least if the distinction is supposed not to beg other important questions in normative ethics.
|
|
| 7. |
- Bykvist, Krister, 1965-
(author)
-
Being and well-being
- 2015
-
In: Weighing and reasoning. - Oxford : Oxford University Press. - 9780199684908
-
Book chapter (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This chapter discusses the question of whether we can make it better for a person by creating her. It argues that John Broome’s argument for a negative answer to this question can be improved upon to avoid some recent criticisms. Instead of being concerned with whether a state of affairs that is better for you would be better for you if it obtained, we should ask whether it could make things better for you. It is also shown that these criticisms assume a mistaken idea about what it means to say that abstract states of affairs have value. The correct idea is that valuable states of affairs are possible value-makers of the world.
|
|
| 8. |
- Bykvist, Krister, 1965-, et al.
(author)
-
Belief, Truth, and Blindspots
- 2013
-
In: The Aim of Belief. - Oxford : Oxford University Press. - 9780199672134 - 9780191759079 ; , s. 100-122
-
Book chapter (peer-reviewed)
|
|
| 9. |
|
|
| 10. |
- Bykvist, Krister
(author)
-
Changing preferences : A study in preferentialism
- 1998
-
Doctoral thesis (other academic/artistic)abstract
- This thesis deals with preferentialism, a family of theories claiming that moral considerationsshould be based entirely on preferences. The emphasis is on preference utilitarianism,according to which preferences determine the values of outcomes and these values determinewhat we should do. The main aim is to find a version of preference utilitarianism that (1) fitsclosely to our intuitions about cases in which preferences change, either across time or acrossavailable outcomes, and (2) can be embedded in a consequentialist framework.In Part One, I define several important versions of preferentialism. In particular, Idistinguish between the satisfaction version, according to which value is ultimately assignedto satisfactions and frustrations, and the object version, according to which value is ultimatelyassigned to the objects of preferences. I also distinguish between outcome-transcendent andoutcome-bound versions of preferentialism. The former theories but not the latter accept thatwhat we should do may depend on factsabout how well an outcome matches preferencesoutside that outcome.Part Two concerns outcome-bound versions of preferentialism. I focus on cases inwhich preferences change across time and cases in which preferences depend, for their veryexistence, on what the agent does. Theories that exclude preferences because they have acertain temporal location or because they are contingent on the agent's choice are considered.I argue that they lack normative appeal and that they cannot be incorporated into aconsequentialist framework.Part Three is devoted to outcome-transcendent theories. I show that these theories haveimplausible implications for cases in which preferences change, and that they cannot beconstructed as consequentialist theories. Since outcome-transcendent theories go hand in handwith the object version, this also shows that a preference utilitarian has good reasons toembrace the satisfaction version.
|
|
