| 1. |
- Dijk, Oege
(författare)
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Bank run psychology
- 2017
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681. ; 144, s. 87-96
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Banks are inherently susceptible to panics and bank runs due to the problem of maturity mismatch, resulting in both a stable equilibrium in which the bank survives and an unstable equilibrium in which a bank run occurs. Understanding equilibrium selection in this setting is extremely important for safeguarding financial stability. In this paper one new potential factor that determines whether a bank runs gets triggered or not is experimentally studied, namely the psychological state of the depositor. Prior to participating in an experimental bank run game, subjects are either induced with fear, sadness or happiness using an autobiographical emotion induction task. The findings suggest that the presence of background fear significantly increases the likelihood of withdrawal and a subsequent bank run. In addition women are shown to be significantly more likely to withdraw then men, but only in the fear induction treatment. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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| 2. |
- Dijk, Oege, et al.
(författare)
-
Charity, incentives, and performance
- 2017
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Ingår i: Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 2214-8043. ; 66, s. 119-128
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We propose that donating profits to charity may improve firm performance through reduced moral hazard and increased effort in incomplete contract environments. This proposition is tested and confirmed in an incomplete contract principal-agent laboratory experiment where principals' profits are donated to charity. The results show that both principals and agents have higher earnings in treatments where principals are working on behalf of a charity. Only in the charity treatments do agents respond positively to the effort levels suggested by the principals, and do higher requested levels of effort result in higher principal earnings. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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| 3. |
- Dijk, Oege, et al.
(författare)
-
Rank matters-The impact of social competition on portfolio choice
- 2014
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Ingår i: European Economic Review. - : Elsevier BV. - 0014-2921 .- 1873-572X. ; 66, s. 97-110
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Tournament incentives' schemes have been criticized for inducing excessive risk-taking among financial market participants. In this paper we investigate how relative performance-based incentive schemes and status concerns for higher rank influence portfolio choice in laboratory experiments. We find that both underperformers and over-performers adapt their portfolios to their current relative performance, preferring either positively or negatively skewed assets, respectively. Most importantly, these results hold both when relative performance is instrumental for higher payoffs in a tournament and when it is only intrinsically motivating and not payout-relevant. We find no effects when no relative performance information is given. © 2013 Elsevier B.V.
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