1. |
- Abtahi Fahliani, Azra, et al.
(författare)
-
DP-ACT: Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Asymmetric Digital Contact Tracing
- 2023
-
Ingår i: The 24th Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium (PETS).
-
Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- Digital contact tracing substantially improves the identification of high-risk contacts during pandemics. Despite several attempts to encourage people to use digital contact-tracing applications by developing and rolling out decentralized privacy-preserving protocols (broadcasting pseudo-random IDs over Bluetooth Low Energy-BLE), the adoption of digital contact tracing mobile applications has been limited, with privacy being one of the main concerns.In this paper, we propose a decentralized privacy-preserving contact tracing protocol, called DP-ACT, with both active and passive participants. Active participants broadcast BLE beacons with pseudo-random IDs, while passive participants model conservative users who do not broadcast BLE beacons but still listen to the broadcasted BLE beacons. We analyze the proposed protocol and discuss a set of interesting properties. The proposed protocol is evaluated using both a face-to-face individual interaction dataset and five real-world BLE datasets. Our simulation results demonstrate that the proposed DP-ACT protocol outperforms the state-of-the-art protocols in the presence of passive users.
|
|
2. |
- Mahfouzi, Rouhollah, et al.
(författare)
-
Butterfly Attack: Adversarial Manipulation of Temporal Properties of Cyber-Physical Systems
- 2019
-
Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- Increasing internet connectivity poses an existential threat for cyber-physical systems. Securing these safety-critical systems becomes an important challenge. Cyber-physical systems often comprise several control applications that are implemented on shared platforms where both high and low criticality tasks execute together (to reduce cost). Such resource sharing may lead to complex timing behaviors and, in turn, counter-intuitive timing anomalies that can be exploited by adversaries to destabilize a critical control system, resulting in irreversible consequences. We introduce the butterfly attack, a new attack scenario against cyber-physical systems that carefully exploits the sensitivity of control applications with respect to the implementation on the underlying execution platforms. We illustrate the possibility of such attacks using two case-studies from the automotive and avionic domains.
|
|