| 1. |
- Moberg, Christina, et al.
(författare)
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De unga gör helt rätt när de stämmer staten
- 2022
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Ingår i: Aftonbladet. - 1103-9000.
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Tidskriftsartikel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- 1 620 forskare och lärare i forskarvärlden: Vi ställer oss bakom Auroras klimatkrav
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| 2. |
- Andersson, Henrik, et al.
(författare)
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Jumping the hurdles of moral progress
- 2023
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Ingår i: Value, morality & social reality : essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen. - : Department of Philosophy, Lund University. - 9789189415652 - 9789189415669 ; , s. 25-37
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In their work on moral progress, Dan Egonsson and Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen both express a worry concerning possible problems caused by value incommensurability. I show that this worry can be alleviated. This is done by explicating the structure of the concept of moral progress and the structure of value comparatives. With a better understanding of the relevant concepts, it becomes clear that value insommensurability does not pose a dead-end for work on moral progress, but is rather a natural part of the normative domain, and consequently, it is merely one more hurdle to pass in our pursuit of moral progress.
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| 3. |
- Bergman, Jakob, et al.
(författare)
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Some Reflections on the Practical Applicability of GIIU
- 2023
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Ingår i: Post Hoc Interventions: Prospects and Problems. - : the Department of Philosophy, Lund University. - 9789189415607 - 9789189415614 ; , s. 47-53
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This chapter discusses developments of GIIU in different ways. As the chapter tries to outline possible lines of future research, it is by nature exploratory, on the verge of being speculative. We discuss the issue when the bias depends on the score in a non-linear way and outline a test to detect different type biases of this kind. We also discuss issues where candidates are awarded multiple scores, when and how to apply GIIU.
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| 4. |
- Brandstedt, Eric, et al.
(författare)
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The Assurance Problem for Transfers Between Generations and the Necessity of Economic Growth
- 2023
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Ingår i: Value, Morality & Social Reality : Essays Dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Pettersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - Essays Dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Pettersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen. - : Department of Philosophy, Lund University. - 9789189415652 - 9789189415669 ; , s. 55-70
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Population ageing is a fact of all advanced economies. Fewer people are born all the while current members live longer. The support which old people have come to depend on, for example through elderly care and pensions, thus becomes increasingly expensive. This accentuates an assurance problem. Although it has been and still is the case that the young are willing to support the currently old, this support is not unconditional. In return they trust that coming generations will support them one day. Historically pro-old welfare state institutions (e.g., pension systems) have offered individuals this assurance: their claim on future generation to support them has been credible simply by positive economic and demographic development. Economic growth has been a blessing for the cooperation between generations necessary to realise old age support. This paper describes this assurance problem in simple game theoretical terms, argues that is has been neglected in historically prominent justifications of pro-old welfare state institutions, and discusses what can be done to preserve trust in times of population ageing and weak economic growth.
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| 5. |
- Garcia, Andrés G., et al.
(författare)
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Individually Fitting but Collectively Unfitting Blame
- 2023
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Ingår i: Value, Morality & Social Reality : Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen. - : Department of Philosophy, Lund University. - 9789189415652 - 9789189415669 ; , s. 159-172
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- People that produce bad outcomes can thereby become the fitting targets of blame, the fitting intensity of which is determined by the badness of the outcomes. In the following paper, I suggest that the amount of blame instances that people are fitting targets of is also determined by the weight of the badness of the outcomes. I use the example of online blame as a paradigmatic case where the amount of blame instances are made targets of risks being excessive, even when each instance of blame is fittingly held and expressed.
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| 6. |
- Gunnemyr, Mattias
(författare)
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Causing Global Warming
- 2019
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Ingår i: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-2820 .- 1572-8447. ; 22:2, s. 399-424
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Do I cause global warming, climate change and their related harms when I go for a leisure drive with my gas-guzzling car? The current verdict seems to be that I do not; the emissions produced by my drive are much too insignificant to make a difference for the occurrence of global warming and its related harms. I argue that our verdict on this issue depends on what we mean by ‘causation’. If we for instance assume a simple counterfactual analysis of causation according to which ‘C causes E’ means ‘if C had not occurred, E would not have occurred’, we must conclude that a single drive does not cause global warming. However, this analysis of causation is well-known for giving counterintuitive results in some important cases. If we instead adopt Lewis’s (2000) analysis of causation, it turns out that it is indeterminate whether I cause global warming (etc.) when I go for a single drive. Still, in contexts where we seek to control or understand global warming, there is a pressure to adopt a more fragile view of this event. When we adopt such a view, it turns out that a single drive does cause global warming (etc.). This means that we cannot like Sinnott-Armstrong (2005) and Kingston and Sinnott-Armstrong (2018) reject the idea that I should refrain from going for a leisure drive simply because such a drive does not cause global warming.
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| 7. |
- Gunnemyr, Mattias
(författare)
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Jordbävningen och livbåten
- 2012
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Ingår i: Filosofisk tidskrift. - 0348-7482. ; 33:1
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 8. |
- Gunnemyr, Mattias
(författare)
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Kollektivt ansvar, kollektiva handlingar och storskaliga problem
- 2018
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Ingår i: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi. - 1402-2710. ; :2, s. 47-47
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Det verkar rimligt att anta att du endast är moraliskt ansvarig för något om du har åstadkommit detta genom dina handlingar. Utan en handling, inget moraliskt ansvar. Om vi antar att samma sak gäller kollektivt ansvar, så måste vi dra slutsatsen att vi som bidrar till problem som den globala uppvärmningen, utfiskningen, etc. inte är kollektivt ansvariga för dessa problem. Vi som exempelvis bidrar till den globala uppvärmningen utför nämligen inte en kollektiv handling som resulterar i detta problem. Utan en kollektiv handling, inget kollektivt moraliskt ansvar. Istället behöver vi förklara hur individuella agenter (individer, företag, regeringar, etc.) kan vara ansvariga för ett kollektivt utfall.
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| 9. |
- Gunnemyr, Mattias, et al.
(författare)
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Kommentar från fyra doktorander vid Lunds universitet : Comments from four doctoral students at Lund University
- 2019
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Ingår i: Svenska Dagbladet. - 1101-2412.
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Tidskriftsartikel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- In an earlier article, Inger Enkvist argues that the working conditions for the doctoral students in Sweden are too good since they are employed. We question her arguments and her conclusion. We show that there have not been a decline in the number of doctoral students since the universities started to employ doctoral students. Moreover, we argue that the new policy has improved the doctoral student's possibilities to engage in the research environments at the departments. We also question why it would be a problem when a doctoral student take parental leave, something Enkvist thinks.
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| 10. |
- Gunnemyr, Mattias
(författare)
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Making a vague difference : Kagan, Nefsky and the Sorites Paradox
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Ingår i: Inquiry (United Kingdom). - 0020-174X.
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In collective harm cases, bad consequences follow if enough people act in a certain way even though no such individual act makes a difference for the worse. Global warming, overfishing and Derek Parfit’s famous case of the harmless torturers are some examples of such harm. Shelly Kagan argues that there is a threshold such that one single act might trigger harm in all collective harm cases. Julia Nefsky points to serious shortcomings in Kagan’s argument, but does not show that his conclusion is incorrect. I argue that our best theories of vagueness (the epistemic view of vagueness, three-valued logic, and supervaluationism) entail that there is a threshold in all collective harm cases. However, my analysis points to another problem with Kagan’s argument: the thresholds are not necessarily perceptible. Given the assumption that only perceptible differences matter morally, passing such a threshold does not necessarily trigger morally relevant harm, pace Kagan. Last, I consider two variants of Kagan’s argument and find both problematic. One controversially assumes that observational relations like ‘cannot perceive the difference between’ are transitive. The other problematically assumes that so called triangulation always is possible.
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| 11. |
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| 12. |
- Gunnemyr, Mattias
(författare)
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Om att orsaka global uppvärmning
- 2019
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Ingår i: Filosofisk tidskrift. - 0348-7482. ; :3
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 13. |
- Gunnemyr, Mattias
(författare)
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Om förtryckande strukturer
- 2006
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Ingår i: Filosofisk tidskrift. - 0348-7482. ; 27:4
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 14. |
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| 15. |
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| 16. |
- Gunnemyr, Mattias
(författare)
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Reasons, Blame, and Collective Harms
- 2021
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Collective harm cases are situations in which things will become worse if enough acts of a certain kind are performed but no single act of the relevant kind will make a difference to the outcome. The inefficacy argument says that since one such act does not make a difference to the outcome, you have no outcome-related reason to refrain from acting in this way. If this argument holds, you have no climate-change-related reason to refrain from going for a drive in a fossil fuel powered car, and no harm-to-the-victim-related reason to refrain from flipping the switch in Derek Parfit’s (1984) famous case of the harmless torturers. There are two ways in which you could understand the inefficacy argument. Either, it says that you lack a reason to act in the relevant way because one such act makes no difference at all to the outcome, or it says that you lack a reason to act in the relevant way because the outcome will occur whether or not you act in this way. Either way, the argument is unfounded. Acting in the relevant way does make a difference to the outcome. Given that there is a possibility that the outcome will occur and a possibility that it will not, acting in the relevant way makes the outcome closer to happening (or further from not happening). In technical terms: acting in the relevant way makes the outcome more secure within the relevant possibility horizon. Thus, the first suggested interpretation of the inefficacy argument is unsound. The second interpretation rests implicitly on a flawed understanding of causation according to which causes always make a difference to whether or not their outcomes occur. An improved account of causation entails that there is a causal connection between the single act and the outcome in collective harm cases. It entails, for instance, that going for just one drive in a fossil fuel powered car is a cause (one of many) of climate change, and that flipping a switch is a cause (one of many) of the victim’s pain in the case of the harmless torturers. Drawing from this account of causation, it is possible to explain when, and why, you have outcome-related reasons in collective harm cases. You have an outcome-related reason to act in a certain way when acting in this way makes a good outcome more secure within the relevant possibility horizon. This account captures the intuitive idea that you have outcome-related reasons to contribute to good outcomes, and to refrain from contributing to bad ones. It also produces intuitively correct verdicts about what outcome-related reasons you have in many different kinds of cases, including collective harm cases (with or without a threshold), pre-emption cases, switching cases, overdetermination cases, omission cases, Frankfurt-style cases, cases where we disregard irrelevant possibilities, the difficult case of the thirsty traveller, and more. Importantly, this account provides the resources to pinpoint the problem in the second variety of the inefficacy argument. You might have an outcome-related reason to refrain from acting in the relevant way in collective harm cases even if the harmful outcome will occur whether you refrain or not: you have such a reason if there is a possibility that the outcome will occur, a possibility that it will not occur, and acting in this way makes the outcome closer to happening. There is also a question of whether you could be blameworthy for the outcome in collective harm cases. An adjusted version of the inefficacy argument says that you cannot be blameworthy for the outcome in collective harm cases since what you do makes no difference to the outcome. Also this version of the argument is mistaken, and for the same reasons. Building on the mentioned account of causation, it is possible to explain when and why you are blameworthy for an action, omission or outcome. You are blameworthy for X – where X is an act, omission or outcome – if and only if a poor quality of will of yours in relation to X was a cause of X. Like the proposed account of reasons, the account of blameworthiness produces intuitively correct verdicts in a wide range of cases.
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| 17. |
- Gunnemyr, Mattias, et al.
(författare)
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Reasons for action : making a difference to the security of outcomes
- 2023
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Ingår i: Philosophical Studies. - : Springer. - 0031-8116 .- 1573-0883. ; 180, s. 333-362
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper, we present a new account of teleological reasons, i.e. reasons to perform a particular action because of the outcomes it promotes. Our account gives the desired verdict in a number of difficult cases, including cases of overdetermination and non-threshold cases like Parfit’s famous Drops of water. The key to our account is to look more closely at the metaphysics of causation. According to Touborg (The dual nature of causation, 2018), it is a necessary condition for causation that a cause increases the security of its effect. Building on this idea, we suggest, roughly, that you have a teleological reason to act in a certain way when doing so increases the security of some good outcome. This represents a middle way between the proposal that you have a reason to act in a certain way just in case this would cause a good outcome and the proposal that you have a reason to act in a certain way just in case this could cause a good outcome.
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| 18. |
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| 19. |
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| 20. |
- Gunnemyr, Mattias
(författare)
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Sufficient Reasons to Act Wrongly : Making Parfit’s Kantian Contractualist Formula Consistent with Reasons
- 2017
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Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 45:1, s. 227-246
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In On What Matters (2011) Derek Parfit advocates the Kantian Contractualist Formula as one of three supreme moral principles. In important cases, this formula entails that it is wrong for an agent to act in a way that would be partially best. In contrast, Parfit’s wide value-based objective view of reasons entails that the agent often have sufficient reasons to perform such acts. It seems then that agents might have sufficient reasons to act wrongly. In this paper I will argue that such reasons are a symptom of a fundamental inconsistency between the Kantian Contractualist Formula and Parfit’s view of reasons. The formula requires that we consider what everyone could rationally will, while a wide value-based objective view requires that we consider only what the agent has sufficient reasons for doing. The same inconsistency is particularly obvious in Parfit’s version of the Consent Principle, which share important features with the Kantian Contractualist Formula. Parfit accepts that moral principles might entail that we sometimes have sufficient reasons to act wrongly. However, to accept that supreme moral principles have such implications is objectionable if you, like Parfit, also hold that principles with such implications should be rejected or revised. I suggest that we could abandon the requirement that we have to consider the reasons of everyone. This would make the Kantian Contractualist Formula consistent with Parfit’s view of reasons, at least in this respect. I also argue that we can keep most implications of the Kantian Contractualist Formula that Parfit finds attractive.
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| 21. |
- Gunnemyr, Mattias
(författare)
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Why the Social Connection Model Fails : Participation is Neither Necessary nor Sufficient for Political Responsibility
- 2020
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Ingår i: Hypatia. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 0887-5367 .- 1527-2001. ; 35:4, s. 567-586
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Iris Marion Young presents a social connection model on which those, and only those, who participate in structural processes that produce injustice have a forward-looking responsibility to redress the resulting injustice by challenging the structures that produce it (she sometimes calls this a political responsibility [Young 2011]). In Young's view, this is an all-things-considered, albeit discretionary, responsibility. I argue that participation in a structural process that produces injustice is neither necessary nor sufficient for having political responsibilities, and that therefore the social connection model must be rejected. A subtler model is needed, one that depicts participation in a structural process that produces injustice as sufficient (but not necessary) for having pro tanto forward-looking responsibilities to redress the process, unless the participating agent satisfies certain excusing conditions. I suggest the intuitive force of the thought that mere participation gives us political responsibilities can be explained by more fundamental considerations. Hastily, we might conclude that all participants have political responsibilities simply because most of them satisfy at least one of the following conditions: they cause injustice to continue, they are morally responsible for injustice, they benefit from injustice, they have communal ties with the victims of injustice, or they have the capacity to redress injustice.
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| 22. |
- Gåvertsson, Frits, et al.
(författare)
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Socratic Provocation in Art
- 2023
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Ingår i: Value, Morality & Social Reality : Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Peterson, & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Peterson, & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen. - : Department of Philosophy, Lund University. - 9789189415652 - 9789189415669 ; , s. 193-207
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In his ‘Provocation in Philosophy and Art’ Dan Egonsson argues that provocation is integral to Socrates’ way of doing philosophy both when aiming for (the interlocutor’s) personal moral development and as an instrument for societal change, and that provocation in art differs significantly from its Socratic counterpart. Morally dubious provocation in art can, however, Egonsson argues be justified on the grounds of its aesthetic qualities. In this response I discuss a number of aspects of Egonsson’s insightful and thought-provoking treatment of the Socratic method and artistic provocation, and argue that Socratic provocation can have an important role to play in art that is structurally similar to its role in philosophy since provocative features of a work of art can be what grounds, or makes experientially available, the aesthetic qualities of the work.
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| 23. |
- Halldenius, Lena, et al.
(författare)
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Human Rights and Human Dignity
- 2023
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Ingår i: Value, Morality & Social Reality : Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen - Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen. - : Department of Philosophy, Lund University. - 9789189415652 - 9789189415669 ; , s. 209-222
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This contribution is an analysis of the philosophical construction of the dignity of the human, with a critical but hopefully constructive engagement with Dan Egonsson’s reflections on social attitudes about the dignity of humanity and how and why moral philosophers ought to account for then. I agree that philosophers should account for actual social attitudes, but my discussion will tend towards the conclusion that “accounting for” should be a consciously political and critical exercise, lest philosophers risk reproducing prejudice and bias.
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| 24. |
- Hansson Wahlberg, Tobias, et al.
(författare)
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The Truth about Social Entities
- 2023
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Ingår i: Value, Morality & Social Reality : Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rönnow-Rasmussen - Essays dedicated to Dan Egonsson, Björn Petersson & Toni Rönnow-Rasmussen. - : Department of Philosophy, Lund University. - 9789189415652 - 9789189415669 ; , s. 483-497
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)
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| 25. |
- Jonasson, Sven, et al.
(författare)
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Modeller för transport och spridning av föroreningar fas 2
- 2007
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Grundvattenmodeller kan vara mycket kraftfulla verktyg för att beräkna och visualisera grundvattenflöde och föroreningstransport. I rätt sammanhang och rätt använda är grundvattenmodeller viktiga och kostnadseffektiva verktyg för att ta fram beslutsunderlag för riskbedömningar, åtgärdsförslag, projektering av efterbehandlingsåtgärder, etc. Föreliggande handledning syftar till att underlätta användning av modellverktyg för beskrivning av föroreningstransport med grundvatten, samt medverka till att höja kunskapsnivån så att dessa verktyg används på ett lämpligt sätt. Handledningen är programoberoende och har tagits fram för att ge handfasta råd för upprättande av modeller för simulering av föroreningstransport. Handledningen omfattar hela modelleringsprocessen, från de förberedande arbetena, själva upprättandet av modellen till avrapporteringen. Modelleringsprocessen tar sin början i problemformuleringen. Sedan följer upprättandet en konceptuell hydrogeologisk modell över det aktuella området. Den konceptuella modellen används som underlag vid skapande av den numeriska modellen. För detta arbete krävs en god förståelse geologiska förhållanden, anläggningar som ändrar de naturliga grundvattenflödena, områdets vattenbalans, grundvattennivåer, grundvattenflöden och vattenstånd i vattendrag och grundvattenkemisk karaktärisering. Numeriska beräkningsmodeller för beräkning av föroreningstransport kan göras på många olika sätt alltifrån relativt enkla till mycket komplexa modeller. Den numeriska flödesmodellen upprättas sedan i en programvara/-kod. Modellen lagerindelas på lämpligt sätt utifrån de geologiska förutsättningarna och avgränsas geografiskt utifrån de hydrauliska förutsättningarna genom ansättande av s k randvillkor. Baserat på vilken flödesmodell som utnyttjas kan sedan olika moduler kopplas på för att beräkna masstransporten av föroreningar som tar hänsyn till diffusion och dispersion, nedbrytning, kemiska reaktioner, avångning, sorptionsprocesser etc. Det är viktigt att modellen inte blir mer komplex än att den ger de svar som vi är ute efter. För att modellera och simulera ämnestransport i grundvatten krävs ett antal nödvändiga indata och kvalitet. Mängd och typ styr hur komplex modellen kan vara samt vilka resultat som kan förväntas från modelleringsarbetet. När modellen har upprättats skall den kalibreras och valideras. Kalibrering i egentlig betydelse innebär att man på ett objektivt sätt justerar modellen till dess att överensstämmelse mellan konstaterade förhållanden och av modellen predikterade förhållanden erhålls. För att värdera hur bra modellen är kalibrerad och överensstämmer med verkligheten bör den testas mot oberoende data. Det kan t ex vara från en annan tidsperiod eller från uppmätta nivåer eller flöden som ej använts för kalibreringen. Detta kallas validering. När väl detta är genomfört kan modellen användas för att beräkna föroreningstransport för olika scenarion och som beslutsunderlag för att miljökonsekvenser, åtgärdsförslag, kontrollprogram, etc.
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