SwePub - search: L773:1930 2975

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1.	Ahmed, Ali M., 1977- (author) Decisions under unpredictable losses : An examination of the restated diversification principle 2007 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - : Society forJudgement and Decision Making. - 1930-2975. ; 2:5, s. 312-316 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract An experimental test of the descriptive adequacy of the restated diversification principle is presented. The principle postulates that risk-averse utility maximizers will pool risks for their mutual benefit, even if information is missing about the probabilities of losses. It is enough for people to assume that they face equal risks when they pool risks. The results of the experiment support the principle.
2.	Andersson, Patric, et al. (author) Now you see it now you don't : The effectiveness of the recognition heuristic for selecting stocks 2007 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - : Soc Judgment & Decision Making. - 1930-2975 .- 1930-2975. ; 2:1, s. 29-39 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract It has been proposed that recognition can form the basis of simple but ecologically rational decision strategies (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). Borges, Goldstein, Ortmann, & Gigerenzer (1999) found that constructing share portfolios based on simple name recognition alone often yielded better returns than the market index. We describe four studies with seven samples of participants from three countries (total N = 319) in which the returns of recognized and unrecognized shares from several stock markets were tracked over various periods of time. We find no support for the claim that a simple strategy of name recognition can be used as a general strategy to select stocks that yield better-than-average returns. However, there was some suggestion in the data that recognition performs better when the market is falling and worse when it is rising. A follow-up study indicated that the absence of an overall recognition effect could not easily be attributed to our reliance on student participants or smaller samples than Borges et al. (1999) had used. We conclude that, with respect to changes in value, selecting stocks on the basis of name recognition is a near-random method of portfolio construction that offers little, if any, benefit to the personal investor.
3.	Buratti, Sandra, 1983, et al. (author) Improved realism of confidence for an episodic memory event 2012 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - 1930-2975. ; 7:5, s. 590-601 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract We asked whether people can make their confidence judgments more realistic (accurate) by adjusting them, with the aim of improving the relationship between the level of confidence and the correctness of the answer. This adjustment can be considered to include a so-called second-order metacognitive judgment. The participants first gave confidence judgments about their answers to questions about a video clip they had just watched. Next, they attempted to increase their accuracy by identifying confidence judgments in need of adjustment and then modifying them. The participants managed to increase their metacognitive realism, thus decreasing their absolute bias and improving their calibration, although the effects were small. We also examined the relationship between confidence judgments that were adjusted and the retrieval fluency and the phenomenological memory quality participants experienced when first answering the questions; this quality was one of either Remember (associated with concrete, vivid details) or Know (associated with a feeling of familiarity). Confidence judgments associated with low retrieval fluency and the memory quality of knowing were modified more often. In brief, our results provide evidence that people can improve the realism of their confidence judgments, mainly by decreasing their confidence for incorrect answers. Thus, this study supports the conclusion that people can perform successful second-order metacognitive judgments.
4.	Chaxel, Anne-Sophie, et al. (author) Preference-driven biases in decision makers' information search and evaluation 2013 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - 1930-2975. ; 8:5, s. 561-576 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract While it is well established that the search for information after a decision is biased toward supporting that decision, the case of preference-supporting search before the decision remains open. Three studies of consumer choices consistently found a complete absence of a pre-choice bias toward searching for preference-supporting information. The absence of this confirming search bias occurred for products that were both hedonic and utilitarian, both expensive and inexpensive, and both high and low in expected brand loyalty. Experiment 3 also verified the presence of the expected post-choice search bias to support the chosen alternative. Therefore the absence of a pre-choice search bias in all three studies was not likely to be due to our using a method that was so insensitive that a search bias would not be observed under any circumstances. In addition to the absence of an effect of prior preferences on information selection, subjects' self-reported search strategies exhibited a clear tendency toward a balance of positive and negative information. Across the three studies, we also tested for the presence of a preference-supporting bias in the evaluation of the information acquired in the search process. This evaluation bias was found both pre- and post-choice.
5.	Donovan, Sarah J., et al. (author) Improving dynamic decision making through training and self-reflection 2015 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - 1930-2975. ; 10:4, s. 284-295 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract The modern business environment requires managers to make effective decisions in a dynamic and uncertain world. How can such dynamic decision making (DDM) improve? The current study investigated the effects of brief training aimed at improving DDM skills in a virtual DDM task. The training addressed the DDM process, stressed the importance of self-reflection in DDM, and provided 3 self-reflective questions to guide participants during the task. Additionally, we explored whether participants low or high in self-reflection would perform better in the task and whether participants low or high in self-reflection would benefit more from the training. The study also explored possible strategic differences between participants related to training and self-reflection. Participants were 68 graduate business students. They individually managed a computer-simulated chocolate production company called CHOCO FINE and answered surveys to assess self-reflection and demographics. Training in DDM led to better performance, including the ability to solve initial problems more successfully and to make appropriate adjustments to market changes. Participants' self-reflection scores also predicted performance in this virtual business company. High self-reflection was also related to more consistency in planning and decision making. Participants low in self-reflection benefitted the most from training. Organizations could use DDM training to establish and promote a culture that values self-reflective decision making.
6.	Eriksson, Gabriella, 1983-, et al. (author) The time-saving bias : Judgements, cognition and perception 2013 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 1930-2975. ; 8:4, s. 492-497 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract Biases in people's judgments of time saved by increasing the speed of an activity have been studied mainly with hypothetical scenarios (Svenson, 2008). The present study asked whether the classic time-saving bias persists as a perceptual bias when we control the speed of an activity and assess the perceived time elapsed at different speeds. Specifically, we investigated the time-saving bias in a driving simulator. Each participant was asked to first drive a distance at a given speed and then drive the same distance again at the speed she or he judged necessary to gain exactly three minutes in travel time compared to the first trip. We found that that the time-saving bias applies to active driving and that it affects the choice of driving speed. The drivers' time-saving judgements show that the perception of the time elapsed while driving does not eliminate the time-saving bias.
7.	Eriksson, Kimmo, 1967-, et al. (author) Deception and price in a market with asymmetric information 2007 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - 1930-2975. ; 2:1, s. 23-28 Journal article (pop. science, debate, etc.)abstract In markets with asymmetric information, only sellers have knowledge about the quality of goods. Sellers may of course make a declaration of the quality, but unless there are sanctions imposed on false declarations or reputations are at stake, such declarations are tantamount to cheap talk. Nonetheless, in an experimental study we find that most people make honest declarations, which is in line with recent findings that lies damaging another party are costly in terms of the liar’s utility. Moreover, we find in this experimental market that deceptive sellers offer lower prices than honest sellers, which could possibly be explained by the same wish to limit the damage to the other party. However, when the recipient of the offer is a social tie we find no evidence for lower prices of deceptive offers, which seems to indicate that the rationale for the lower price in deceptive offers to strangers is in fact profit-seeking (by making the deal more attractive) rather than moral.
8.	Eriksson, Kimmo, 1967-, et al. (author) Emotional reactions to losing explain gender differences in entering a risky lottery 2010 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - 1930-2975. ; 5:3, s. 159-163 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract A gender difference in risk preferences, with women being more averse to risky choices, is a robust experimental finding. Speculating on the sources of this difference, Croson and Gneezy recently pointed to the tendency for women to experience emotions more strongly and suggested that feeling more strongly about negative outcomes would lead to greater risk-aversion. Here we test this hypothesis in an international survey with 424 respondents from India and 416 from US where we ask questions about a hypothetical lottery. In both countries we find that emotions about outcomes are stronger among women, and that this effect partially mediates gender difference in willingness to enter the lottery.
9.	Eriksson, Kimmo, et al. (author) Political double standards in reliance on moral foundations 2019 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 1930-2975. ; 14:4, s. 440-454 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract Prior research using the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) has established that political ideology is associated with self-reported reliance on specific moral foundations in moral judgments of acts. MFQ items do not specify the agents involved in the acts, however. By specifying agents in MFQ items we revealed blatant political double standards. Conservatives thought that the same moral foundation was more relevant if victims were agents that they like (i.e., corporations and other conservatives) but less relevant when the same agents were perpetrators. Liberals showed the same pattern for agents that they like (i.e., news media and other liberals). A UK sample showed much weaker political double standards with respect to corporations and news media, consistent with feelings about corporations and news media being much less politicized in the UK than in the US. We discuss the implications for moral foundations theory.
10.	Eriksson, Kimmo, 1967-, et al. (author) Procedural priming of a numerical cognitive illusion 2016 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 1930-2975. ; 11:3, s. 205-212 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract A strategy activated in one task may be transferred to subsequent tasks and prevent activation of other strategies that would otherwise come to mind, a mechanism referred to as procedural priming. In a novel application of procedural priming we show that it can make or break cognitive illusions. Our test case is the 1/k illusion, which is based on the same unwarranted mathematical shortcut as the MPG illusion and the time-saving bias. The task is to estimate distances between values of fractions on the form 1/k. Most people given this task intuitively base their estimates on the distances between the denominators (i.e., the reciprocals of the fractions), which may yield very poor estimations of the true distances between the fractions. As expected, the tendency to fall for this illusion is related to cognitive style (Study 1). In order to apply procedural priming we constructed versions of the task in which the illusion is weak, in the sense that most people do not fall for it anymore. We then gave participants both “strong illusion” and “weak illusion” versions of the task (Studies 2 and 3). Participants who first did the task in the weak illusion version would often persist with the correct strategy even in the strong illusion version, thus breaking the otherwise strong illusion in the latter task. Conversely, participants who took the strong illusion version first would then often fall for the illusion even in the weak illusion version, thus strengthening the otherwise weak illusion in the latter task.
11.	Eriksson, Kimmo, et al. (author) Spontaneous associations and label framing have similar effects in the public goods game 2014 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 1930-2975. ; 9:5, s. 360-372 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract It is known that presentation of a meaningful label (e. g., The Teamwork Game) can influence decisions in economic games. A common view is that such labels cue associations to preexisting mental models of situations, a process here called frame selection. In the absence of such cues, participants may still spontaneously associate a game with a preexisting frame. We used the public goods game to compare the effect of such spontaneous frame selection with the effect of label framing. Participants in a condition where the public goods game was labeled The Teamwork Game tended to contribute at the same level as participants who spontaneously associated the unlabeled game with teamwork, whereas those who did not associate the the unlabeled game with teamwork tended to make lower contributions. We conclude that neutrally described games may be subject to spontaneous frame selection effects comparable in size to the effects of label framing.
12.	Eriksson, Kimmo, 1967-, et al. (author) The available evidence suggests the percent measure should not be used to study inequality : Reply to Norton and Ariely 2013 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 1930-2975. ; 8:3, s. 395-396 Journal article (other academic/artistic)abstract In this reply, we reiterate the main point of our 2012 paper, which was that the measure of inequality used by Norton and Ariely (2011) was too difficult for it to yield meaningful results. We describe additional evidence for this conclusion, and we also challenge the conclusion that political differences in perceived and desired inequality are small.
13.	Eriksson, Kimmo (author) The nonsense math effect 2012 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 1930-2975. ; 7:6, s. 746-749 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract Mathematics is a fundamental tool of research. Although potentially applicable in every discipline, the amount of training in mathematics that students typically receive varies greatly between different disciplines. In those disciplines where most researchers do not master mathematics, the use of mathematics may be held in too much awe. To demonstrate this I conducted an online experiment with 200 participants, all of which had experience of reading research reports and a postgraduate degree (in any subject). Participants were presented with the abstracts from two published papers (one in evolutionary anthropology and one in sociology). Based on these abstracts, participants were asked to judge the quality of the research. Either one or the other of the two abstracts was manipulated through the inclusion of an extra sentence taken from a completely unrelated paper and presenting an equation that made no sense in the context. The abstract that included the meaningless mathematics tended to be judged of higher quality. However, this nonsense math effect was not found among participants with degrees in mathematics, science, technology or medicine.
14.	Eriksson, Kimmo, et al. (author) What do Americans know about inequality? It depends on how you ask them 2012 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 1930-2975. ; 7:6, s. 741-745 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract A recent survey of inequality (Norton and Ariely, Perspectives on Psychological Science, 6, 9-12) asked respondents to indicate what percent of the nation's total wealth is-and should be-controlled by richer and poorer quintiles of the U.S. population. We show that such measures lead to powerful anchoring effects that account for the otherwise remarkable findings that respondents reported perceiving, and desiring, extremely low inequality in wealth. We show that the same anchoring effects occur in other domains, namely web page popularity and school teacher salaries. We introduce logically equivalent questions about average levels of inequality that lead to more accurate responses. Finally, when we made respondents aware of the logical connection between the two measures, the majority said that typical responses to the average measures, indicating higher levels of inequality, better reflected their actual perceptions and preferences than did typical responses to percent measures.
15.	Eriksson, Kimmo, 1967-, et al. (author) When is it appropriate to reprimand a norm violation? : The roles of anger, behavioral consequences, violation severity, and social distance 2017 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - : Society for Judgment and Decision making. - 1930-2975. ; 12:4, s. 396-407 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract Experiments on economic games typically fail to find positive reputational effects of using peer punishment of selfish behavior in social dilemmas. Theorists had expected positive reputational effects because of the potentially beneficial consequences that punishment may have on norm violators’ behavior. Going beyond the game-theoretic paradigm, we used vignettes to study how various social factors influence approval ratings of a peer who reprimands a violator of a group-beneficial norm. We found that ratings declined when punishers showed anger, and this effect was mediated by perceived aggressiveness. Thus the same emotions that motivate peer punishers may make them come across as aggressive, to the detriment of their reputation. However, the negative effect of showing anger disappeared when the norm violation was sufficiently severe. Ratings of punishers were also influenced by social distance, such that it is less appropriate for a stranger than a friend to reprimand a violator. In sum, peer punisher ratings were very high for a friend reprimanding a severe norm violation, but particularly poor for a stranger showing anger at a mild norm violation. We found no effect on ratings of whether the reprimand had the beneficial consequence of changing the violator’s behavior. Our findings provide insight into how peer punishers can avoid negative reputational effects. They also point to the importance of going beyond economic games when studying peer punishment.
16.	ERLANDSSON, ARVID, et al. (author) Choice-justifications after allocating resources in helping dilemmas 2017 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - : SOC JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING. - 1930-2975. ; 12:1, s. 60-80 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract How do donors reason and justify their choices when faced with dilemmas in a charitable context? In two studies, Swedish students were confronted with helping dilemmas based on the identifiable victim effect, the proportion dominance effect and the ingroup effect. Each dilemma consisted of two comparable charity projects and participants were asked to choose one project over the other. They were then asked to provide justifications of their choice by stating the relative importance of different types of reasons. When faced with an identified victim dilemma, participants did not choose the project including an identified victim more often than the project framed statistically, but those who did emphasized emotional reasons (e.g., “Because I had more empathic feelings”), but not any other reasons, more than those choosing the statistical project. When faced with a Proportion dominance dilemma, participants more often chose the project with a high rescue proportion (e.g., you can save 100% out of 30) than the project with a low rescue proportion (e.g., you can save 4% out of 800), and those who did emphasized efficacy reasons (e.g., “Because my money can make a greater difference there”), but no other reasons, more than those favoring the low recue proportion project. Finally, when faced with an Ingroup dilemma, participants more often chose the project that could help ingroup-victims over the project that could help outgroup victims, and those who did emphasized responsibility reasons (e.g., “Because I have a greater obligation”), but no other reasons, more than those favoring outgroup projects. These results are consistent with and extend previous findings about how different helping effects are related to different psychological processes.
17.	Erlandsson, Arvid, et al. (author) Moral preferences in helping dilemmas expressed by matching and forced choice 2020 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - Tallahassee, FL, United States : SOC JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING. - 1930-2975. ; 15:4, s. 452-475 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract This paper asks whether moral preferences in eight medical dilemmas change as a function of how preferences are expressed, and how people choose when they are faced with two equally attractive help projects. In two large-scale studies, participants first read dilemmas where they "matched" two suggested helping projects (which varied on a single attribute) so that they became equally attractive. They did this by filling in a missing number (e.g., how many male patients must Project M save in order to be equally attractive as Project F which can save 100 female patients). Later, the same participants were asked to choose between the two equally attractive projects. We found robust evidence that people do not choose randomly, but instead tend to choose projects that help female (vs. male), children (vs. adult), innocent (vs. non-innocent), in group (vs. outgroup) and existing (vs. future) patients, and imply no (vs. some) risk of a harmful side-effect, even when these projects have been matched as equally attractive as, and save fewer patients than the contrasting project. We also found that some moral preferences are hidden when expressed with matching but apparent when expressed with forced choice. For example, 88-95% of the participants expressed that female and male patients are equally valuable when doing the matching task, but over 80% of them helped female patients in the choice task.
18.	Erlandsson, Arvid (author) Seven (weak and strong) helping effects systematically tested in separate evaluation, joint evaluation and forced choice 2021 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - : Society for Judgment and Decision Making. - 1930-2975. ; 16:5, s. 1113-1154 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract In ten studies (N = 9187), I systematically investigated the direction and size of seven helping effects (the identifiable-victim effect, proportion dominance effect, ingroup effect, existence effect, innocence effect, age effect and gender effect). All effects were tested in three decision modes (separate evaluation, joint evaluation and forced choice), and in their weak form (equal efficiency), or strong form (unequal efficiency). Participants read about one, or two, medical help projects and rated the attractiveness of and allocated resources to the project/projects, or choose which project to implement. The results show that the included help-situation attributes vary in their: (1) Evaluability - e.g., rescue proportion is the easiest to evaluate in separate evaluation. (2) Justifiability - e.g., people prefer to save fewer lives now rather than more lives in the future, but not fewer identified lives rather than more statistical lives. (3) Prominence - e.g., people express a preference to help females, but only when forced to choose.
19.	Gartner, Manja, et al. (author) Affect and prosocial behavior : The role of decision mode and individual processing style 2022 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - : Society for Judgment and Decision Making. - 1930-2975. ; 17:1, s. 1-13 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract We study the effects of experimental manipulation of decision mode (rational "brain" vs. affective "heart") and individual difference in processing styles (intuition vs. deliberation) on prosocial behavior. In a survey experiment with a diverse sample of the Swedish population (n = 1,828), we elicited the individuals processing style and we experimentally manipulated reliance on affect or reason, regardless of subjects preferred mode. Prosocial behavior was measured across a series of commonly used and incentivized games (prisoners dilemma game, public goods game, trust game, dictator game). Our results show that prosocial behavior increased for the affective ("heart") decision mode. Further, individual differences in processing style did not predict prosocial behavior and did not interact with the experimental manipulation.
20.	Juslin, Peter (author) Exemplar-based inference in multi-attribute decision making: Contingent, not automatic, strategy shifts? 2008 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - 1930-2975. ; :3, s. 244-260 Journal article (peer-reviewed)
21.	Karlsson, Hulda, et al. (author) Unit Asking - a method for increasing donations: A replication and extension 2020 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - Tallahassee, FL, United States : SOC JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING. - 1930-2975. ; 15:6, s. 989-993 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract We replicate and extend unit asking - a method to increase donations by first asking donors for their willingness to donate for one unit and then asking for donations for multiple units (Hsee, Zhang & Xu, 2013) We conducted a large scale replication and extension using a 2 (unit asking, control) x 3 (domains; children (original), animals, environment) between-subjects design. Across three domains, we find that unit asking increased donations, suggesting that this method can be used to increase giving to different charitable causes.
22.	Karlsson, Linnea, 1979-, et al. (author) Exemplar-based inference in multi-attribute decision making : contingent, not automatic, strategy shifts? 2008 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - : Cambridge University Press. - 1930-2975. ; 3:3, s. 244-260 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract Several studies propose that exemplar retrieval contributes to multi-attribute decisions. The authors have proposed a process theory enabling a priori predictions of what cognitive representations people use as input to their judgment process (Sigma, for “summation”; P. Juslin, L. Karlsson, & H. Olsson, 2008). According to Sigma, exemplar retrieval is a back-up system when the task does not allow for additive and linear abstraction and integration of cue-criterion knowledge (e.g., when the task is non-additive). An important question is to what extent such shifts occur spontaneously as part of automatic procedures, such as error-minimization with the Delta rule, or if they are controlled strategy shifts contingent on the ability to identify a sufficiently successful judgment strategy. In this article data are reviewed thatdemonstrate a shift between exemplar memory and cue abstraction, as well as data where the expected shift does not occur. In contrast to a common assumption of previous models, these results suggest a controlled and contingent strategy shift.
23.	Kerimi, Neda, 1980-, et al. (author) Coming close to the ideal alternative : The concordant-ranks strategy 2011 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - 1930-2975. ; 6:3, s. 196-210 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract We present the Concordant-Ranks (CR) strategy that decision makers use to quickly find an alternative that is proximate to an ideal alternative in a multi-attribute decision space. CR implies that decision makers prefer alternatives that exhibit concordant ranks between attribute values and attribute weights. We show that, in situations where the alternatives are equal in multi-attribute utility (MAU), minimization of the weighted Euclidean distance (WED) to an ideal alternative implies the choice of a CR alternative. In two experiments, participants chose among, as well as evaluated, alternatives that were constructed to be equal in MAU. In Experiment 1, four alternatives were designed in such a way that the choice of each alternative would be consistent with one particular choice strategy, one of which was the CR strategy. In Experiment 2, participants were presented with a CR alternative and a number of arbitrary alternatives. In both experiments, participants tended to choose the CR alternative. The CR alternative was on average evaluated as more attractive than other alternatives. In addition, measures of WED, between given alternatives and the ideal alternative, by and large agreed with the preference order for choices and attractiveness evaluations of the different types of alternatives. These findings indicate that both choices and attractiveness evaluations are guided by proximity of alternatives to an ideal alternative.
24.	Lagerkvist, Carl-Johan, et al. (author) A meta-analytical and experimental examination of blood glucose effects on decision making under risk 2020 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - 1930-2975. ; 15, s. 1024-1036 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract Previous research has shown that short-term changes in blood glucose influence our preferences and may affect decisions about risk as well. However, consensus is lacking about whether and how blood glucose influences decision making under risk, and we conduct two experiments and a meta-analysis to examine this question in detail. In Study 1, using a pecuniary valuation method, we find no effect of blood glucose on willingness to pay for risky products that may act as allergens. In Study 2, using risky gambles, we find that low levels of blood glucose increase risk taking for food and to a lesser degree for non-food rewards. Combining our own and previous findings in a meta-analysis, we show that low levels of blood glucose on average increase risk taking about food. Low blood glucose does not increase risk taking about non-food rewards although this is subject to heterogeneity. Overall, our studies suggest that low blood glucose increases our willingness to gamble on how much food we can get, but not our willingness to eat food that can harm us. Our findings are best explained by the energy budget rule.
25.	Lindauer, Matthew, et al. (author) Comparing the effect of rational and emotional appeals on donation behavior 2020 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - Tallahassee, FL United States : Society for Judgment and Decision Making. - 1930-2975. ; 15:3, s. 413-420 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract We present evidence from a pre-registered experiment indicating that a philosophical argument - a type of rational appeal - can persuade people to make charitable donations. The rational appeal we used follows Singers "shallow pond" argument (1972), while incorporating an evolutionary debunking argument (Paxton, Ungar and Greene, 2012) against favoring nearby victims over distant ones. The effectiveness of this rational appeal did not differ significantly from that of a well-tested emotional appeal involving an image of a single child in need (Small, Loewenstein and Slovic, 2007). This is a surprising result, given evidence that emotions are the primary drivers of moral action, a view that has been very influential in the work of development organizations. We found no support for our hypothesis that combining our rational and emotional appeals would have a stronger effect than either appeal in isolation. However, our finding that both kinds of appeal can increase charitable donations is cause for optimism, especially concerning the potential efficacy of well-designed rational appeals. We consider the significance of these findings for moral psychology, ethics, and the work of organizations aiming to alleviate severe poverty.
26.	Markowitz, Ezra M., et al. (author) Compassion fade and the challenge of environmental conservation 2013 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - : Society for Judgment and Decision Making. - 1930-2975. ; 8:4, s. 397-406 Journal article (other academic/artistic)abstract Compassion shown towards victims often decreases as the number of individuals in need of aid increases, identifiability of the victims decreases, and the proportion of victims helped shrinks. Such "compassion fade" may hamper individual-level and collective responses to pressing large-scale crises. To date, research on compassion fade has focused on humanitarian challenges; thus, it remains unknown whether and to what extent compassion fade emerges when victims are non-human others. Here we show that compassion fade occurs in the environmental domain, but only among non-environmentalists. These findings suggest that compassion fade may challenge our collective ability and willingness to confront the major environmental problems we face, including climate change. The observed moderation effect of environmental identity further indicates that compassion fade may present a significant psychological barrier to building broad public support for addressing these problems. Our results highlight the importance of bringing findings from the field of judgment and decision making to bear on pressing societal issues.
27.	Martins, Ana, et al. (author) Atypical moral judgements following traumatic brain injury 2012 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - 1930-2975. ; 7:4, s. 478-487 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract Previous research has shown an association between emotions, particularly social emotions, and moral judgments. Some studies suggested an association between blunted emotion and the utilitarian moral judgments observed in patients with prefrontal lesions. In order to investigate how prefrontal brain damage affects moral judgment, we asked a sample of 29 TBI patients (12 females and 17 males) and 41 healthy participants (16 females and 25 males) to judge 22 hypothetical dilemmas split into three different categories (non-moral, impersonal and personal moral). The TBI group presented a higher proportion of affirmative (utilitarian) responses for personal moral dilemmas when compared to controls, suggesting an atypical pattern of utilitarian judgements. We also found a negative association between the performance on recognition of social emotions and the proportion of affirmative responses on personal moral dilemmas. These results suggested that the preference for utilitarian responses in this type of dilemmas is accompanied by difficulties in social emotion recognition. Overall, our findings suggest that deontological moral judgments are associated with normal social emotion processing and that frontal lobe plays an important role in both emotion and moral judgment.
28.	Martinsson, Peter, 1969, et al. (author) Reconciling pro-social vs. selfish behavior: On the role of self-control 2012 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - 1930-2975. ; 7:3, s. 304-315 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract We test in the context of a dictator game the proposition that individuals may experience a self-control conflict between the temptation to act selfishly and the better judgment to act pro-socially. We manipulated the likelihood that individuals would identify self-control conflict, and we measured their trait ability to implement self-control strategies. Our analysis reveals a positive and significant correlation between trait self-control and pro-social behavior in the treatment where we expected a relatively high likelihood of conflict identification-but not in the treatment where we expected a low likelihood. The magnitude of the effect is of economic significance. We conclude that subtle cues might prove sufficient to alter individuals' perception of allocation opportunities, thereby prompting individuals to draw on their own cognitive resources to act pro-socially.
29.	Millroth, Philip, et al. (author) The decision paradoxes motivating Prospect Theory : The prevalence of the paradoxes increases with numerical ability 2019 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - : SOC JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING. - 1930-2975. ; 14:4, s. 513-533 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract Prospect Theory (PT: Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) of risky decision making is based on psychological phenomena (paradoxes) that motivate assumptions about how people react to gains and losses, and how they weight outcomes with probabilities. Recent studies suggest that people's numeracy affect their decision making. We therefore conducted a large-scale conceptual replication of the seminal study by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), where we targeted participants with larger variability in numeracy. Because people low in numeracy may be more dependent on anchors in the form of other judgments we also manipulated design type (within-subject design, vs. single-stimuli design, where participants assess only one problem). The results from about 1,800 participants showed that design type had no effect on the modal choices. The rate of replication of the paradoxes in Kahneman and Tversky was poor and positively related to the participants' numeracy. The Probabilistic Insurance Effect was observed at all levels of numeracy. The Reflection Effects were not fully replicated at any numeracy level. The Certainty and Isolation Effects explained by nonlinear probability weighting were replicated only at high numeracy. No participant exhibited all 9 paradoxes and more than 50% of the participants exhibited at most three of the 9 paradoxes. The choices by the participants with low numeracy were consistent with a shift towards a cautionary non-compensatory strategy of minimizing the risk of receiving the worst possible outcome. We discuss the implications for the psychological assumptions of PT.
30.	Moche, Hajdi, 1991-, et al. (author) The potential and pitfalls of unit asking in reducing scope insensitivity 2023 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - : CAMBRIDGE UNIV PRESS. - 1930-2975. ; 18 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract This article revisits and further investigates the extent to which scope insensitivity in helping contexts can be reduced by the unit asking (UA) method. UA is an intervention that first asks people to help one unit and then asks for willingness to help multiple units. In 3 studies (N = 3,442), participants took on the role of policymakers to allocate help (motivation to help and willingness to pay) to local aid projects. They underwent either UA or a control condition (in which they stated their willingness to help only to the multiple units). Against expectations, the first 2 studies found a reversed UA effect for helping motivation, such that help decreased when participants were in the UA condition. However, the third study found a UA effect for helping motivation when participants made the sequential assessments within one project (when the individual unit belonged to the multiple units-group), rather than between projects (when the individual unit belonged to another group). Thus, our results suggest that the 2 assessments critical for the UA method should be done within the same project rather than between 2 projects to successfully reduce scope insensitivity. Further, the age of the unit (child or adult), the number of the unit(s), the composition of the group (homogeneous or heterogeneous), and the size of the group did not substantially reduce scope insensitivity with UA.
31.	Moche, Hajdi, et al. (author) Thinking, good and bad? Deliberative thinking and the singularity effect in charitable giving : Deliberative thinking and the singularity effect in charitable giving 2022 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - Tallahassee, FL, United States : Society for Judgment & Decision Making. - 1930-2975. ; 17:1, s. 14-30 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract Can deliberation increase charitable giving when giving is impulsive (i.e., a one-time small gift in response to an immediate appeal)? We conduct two studies in Israel and Sweden to compare two forms of deliberation, unguided and guided, in their ability to decrease the singularity effect (i.e., giving more to one than many victims), often evident in impulsive giving. Under unguided deliberation, participants were instructed to simply think hard before making a donation decision whereas participants in the guided deliberation condition were asked to think how much different prespecified decision attributes should influence their decision. We find that both types of deliberation reduce the singularity effect, as people no longer value the single victim higher than the group of victims. Importantly, this is driven by donations being decreased under deliberation only to the single victim, but not the group of victims. Thus, deliberation affects donations negatively by overshadowing the affective response, especially in situations in which affect is greatest (i.e., to a single victim). Last, the results show that neither type of deliberation significantly reversed the singularity effect, as people did not help the group significantly more than the single victim. This means that deliberate thinking decreased the overall willingness to help, leading to a lower overall valuation of people in need.
32.	Myrseth, K. O. R., et al. (author) Less cognitive conflict does not imply choice of the default option: Commentary on Kieslich and Hilbig (2014) 2015 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - 1930-2975. ; 10:3, s. 277-279 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract Kieslich and Hilbig (2014) employ a mouse-tracking technique to measure decision conflict in social dilemmas. They report that defectors exhibit more conflict than do cooperators. They infer that cooperation thus is the reflexive, default behavior. We argue, however, that their analysis fails to discriminate between reflexive versus cognitively controlled behavioral responses. This is because cognitive conflict can emanate from resisting impulse successfully-or unsuccessfully.
33.	Parslow, Elle, et al. (author) Stress and risk - Preferences versus noise 2022 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - : Society for Judgment and Decision Making/Cambridge University Press. - 1930-2975. ; 17:4, s. 883-936 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract We analyze the impact of acute stress on risky choice in a pre-registered laboratory experiment with 194 participants. We test the causal impact of stress on the stability of risk preferences by separating noise in decision-making from an actual shift in preferences. We find no significant differences in risk attitudes across conditions on the aggregate, using both descriptive analyses as well as structural estimations for risk aversion and different noise structures. Additionally, in line with the previous literature, we find statistically significant evidence for lower cognitive abilities being correlated with more noise in decision-making in general. We do not find a significant interaction effect between cognitive abilities and stress on noise levels. © 2022. The authors.
34.	Persson, Emil, et al. (author) The prominence effect in health-care priority setting 2022 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - : SOC JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING. - 1930-2975. ; 17:6, s. 1379-1391 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract People often choose the option that is better on the most subjectively prominent attribute - the prominence effect. We studied the effect of prominence in health care priority setting and hypothesized that values related to health would trump values related to costs in treatment choices, even when individuals themselves evaluated different treatment options as equally good. We conducted pre-registered experiments with a diverse Swedish sample and a sample of international experts on priority setting in health care (n = 1348). Participants, acting in the role of policy makers, revealed their valuation for different medical treatments in hypothetical scenarios. Participants were systematically inconsistent between preferences expressed through evaluation in a matching task and preferences expressed through choice. In line with our hypothesis, a large proportion of participants (General population: 92%, Experts 84% of all choices) chose treatment options that were better on the health dimension (lower health risk) despite having previously expressed indifference between those options and others that were better on the cost dimension. Thus, we find strong evidence of a prominence effect in health-care priority setting. Our findings provide a psychological explanation for why opportunity costs (i.e., the value of choices not exercised) are neglected in health care priority setting.
35.	Scherbaum, Stefan, et al. (author) Process dynamics in delay discounting decisions : An attractor dynamics approach 2016 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - : Elsevier. - 1930-2975. ; 11:5, s. 472-495 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract How do people make decisions between an immediate but small reward and a delayed but large one? The outcome of such decisions indicates that people discount rewards by their delay and hence these outcomes are well described by discounting functions. However, to understand irregular decisions and dysfunctional behavior one needs models which describe how the process of making the decision unfolds dynamically over time: how do we reach a decision and how do sequential decisions influence one another? Here, we present an attractor model that integrates into and extends discounting functions through a description of the dynamics leading to a final choice outcome within a trial and across trials. To validate this model, we derive qualitative predictions for the intra-trial dynamics of single decisions and for the inter-trial dynamics of sequences of decisions that are unique to this type of model. We test these predictions in four experiments based on a dynamic delay discounting computer game where we study the intra-trial dynamics of single decisions via mouse tracking and the inter-trial dynamics of sequences of decisions via sequentially manipulated options. We discuss how integrating decision process dynamics within and across trials can increase our understanding of the processes underlying delay discounting decisions and, hence, complement our knowledge about decision outcomes.
36.	Silverstein, M. C., et al. (author) The numeric understanding measures: Developing and validating adaptive and nonadaptive numeracy scales 2023 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - 1930-2975. ; 18 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract Numeracy-the ability to understand and use numeric information-is linked to good decision-making. Several problems exist with current numeracy measures, however. Depending on the participant sample, some existing measures are too easy or too hard; also, established measures often contain items well-known to participants. The current article aimed to develop new numeric understanding measures (NUMs) including a 1-item (1-NUM), 4-item (4-NUM), and 4-item adaptive measure (A-NUM). In a calibration study, 2 participant samples (n = 226 and 264 from Amazon's Mechanical Turk [MTurk]) each responded to half of 84 novel numeracy items. We calibrated items using 2-parameter logistic item response theory (IRT) models. Based on item parameters, we developed the 3 new numeracy measures. In a subsequent validation study, 600 MTurk participants completed the new numeracy measures, the adaptive Berlin Numeracy Test, and the Weller Rasch-Based Numeracy Test, in randomized order. To establish predictive and convergent validities, participants also completed judgment and decision tasks, Raven's progressive matrices, a vocabulary test, and demographics. Confirmatory factor analyses suggested that the 1-NUM, 4-NUM, and A-NUM load onto the same factor as existing measures. The NUM scales also showed similar association patterns to subjective numeracy and cognitive ability measures as established measures. Finally, they effectively predicted classic numeracy effects. In fact, based on power analyses, the A-NUM and 4-NUM appeared to confer more power to detect effects than existing measures. Thus, using IRT, we developed 3 brief numeracy measures, using novel items and without sacrificing construct scope. The measures can be downloaded as Qualtrics files (https://osf.io/pcegz/).
37.	Svenson, Ola, et al. (author) Different heuristics and same bias : A spectral analysis of biased judgments and individual decision rules 2018 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 1930-2975. ; 13:5, s. 401-412 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract We used correlation and spectral analyses to investigate the cognitive structures and processes producing biased judgments. We used 5 different sets of driving problems to exemplify problems that trigger biases, specifically: (1) underestimation of the impact of occasional slow speeds on mean speed judgments, (2) overestimation of braking capacity after a speed increase, (3) the time saving bias (overestimation of the time saved by increasing a high speed further, and underestimation of time saved when increasing a low speed), (4) underestimation of increase of fatal accident risk when speed is increased, and (5) underestimation of the increase of stopping distance when speed is increased. The results verified the predicted biases. A correlation analysis found no strong links between biases; only accident risk and stopping distance biases were correlated significantly. Spectral analysis of judgments was used to identify different decision rules. Most participants were consistent in their use of a single rule within a problem set with the same bias. The participants used difference, average, weighed average and ratio rules, all producing biased judgments. Among the rules, difference rules were used most frequently across the different biases. We found no personal consistency in the rules used across problem sets. The complexity of rules varied across problem sets for most participants.
38.	Svenson, Ola, et al. (author) Effects of main actor, outcome and affect on biased braking speed judgments 2012 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - : Society for Judgment and Decision Making. - 1930-2975. ; 7:3, s. 235-243 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract Subjects who judged speed in a driving scenario overestimated how fast they could decelerate when speeding compared to when keeping within the speed limit (Svenson, 2009). The purpose of the present studies were to replicate studies conducted in Europe with subjects in the U. S., to study the influence of speed unit (kph vs. mph), affective reactions to outcome (collision) and identity of main actor (driver) on braking speed judgments. The results replicated the European findings and the outcome affective factor (passing a line/killing a child) and the actor factor (subject/driver in general) had significant effects on judgments of braking speed. The results were related to psychological theory and applied implications were discussed.
39.	Svenson, Ola, et al. (author) Modeling and debiasing resource saving judgments 2014 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 1930-2975. ; 9:5, s. 465-478 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract Svenson (2011) showed that choices of one of two alternative productivity increases to save production resources (e.g., man-months) were biased. Judgments of resource savings following a speed increase from a low production speed linewere underestimated and following an increase of a high production speed line overestimated. The objective formula for computing savings includes differences between inverse speeds and this is intuitively very problematic for most people.The purpose of the present studies was to explore ways of ameliorating or eliminating the bias. Study 1 was a control study asking participants to increase the production speed of one production line to save the same amount of production resources(man-months) as was saved by a speed increase in a reference line. The increases judged to match the reference alternatives showed the same bias as in the earlier research on choices. In Study 2 the same task and problems were used as in Study 1,but the participants were asked first to judge the resource saving of the reference alternative in a pair of alternatives before they proceeded to the matching task. This weakened the average bias only slightly. In Study 3, the participants were askedto judge the resources saved from each of two successive increases of the same single production line (other than those of the matching task) before they continued to the matching problems. In this way a participant could realize that a secondproduction speed increase from a higher speed (e.g., from 40 to 60 items /man-month) gives less resource savings than the same speed increase from a first lower speed (e.g., from 20 to 40 items/man-month. Following this, the judgments of thesame problems as in the other studies improved and the bias decreased significantly but it did not disappear. To be able to make optimal decisions about productivity increases, people need information about the bias and/or reformulations of the problems.
40.	Svenson, Ola, et al. (author) Post decision consolidation and distortion of facts 2009 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - : Society for Judgment and Decision Making. - 1930-2975. ; 4:5, s. 397-407 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract Participants decided whom of two patients to prioritize for surgery in three studies. The factual quantitative information about the patients (e.g., probability of surviving surgery) was given in vignette form with case descriptions on Visual Analogue Scales — VAS’s. Differentiation and Consolidation theory predicts that not only the attractiveness of facts but also the mental representations of objective facts themselves will be restructured in post-decision processes in support of a decision (Svenson, 2003). After the decision, participants were asked to reproduce the objective facts about the patients. The results showed that distortions of objective facts were used to consolidate a prior decision. The consolidation process relied on facts initially favoring the non-chosen alternative and on facts rated as less, rather than more important.
41.	Svenson, Ola, et al. (author) Without a mask : Judgments of Corona virus exposure as a function of inter personal distance 2020 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - 1930-2975. ; 15:6, s. 881-888 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract In order to minimize the risk of infection during the Covid-19 pandemic, people are recommended to keep interpersonal distance (e.g., 1 m, 2 m, 6 feet), wash their hands frequently, limit social contacts and sometimes to wear a face mask. We investigated how people judge the protective effect of interpersonal distance against the Corona virus. The REM model, based on earlier empirical studies, describes how a person’s virus exposure decreases with the square of the distance to another person emitting a virus in a face to face situation. In a comparison with model predictions, most participants underestimated the protective effect of moving further away from another person. Correspondingly, most participants were not aware of how much their exposure would increase if they moved closer to the other person. Spectral analysis of judgments showed that a linear ratio model with the independent variable = (initial distance)/(distance to which a person moves) was the most frequently used judgment rule. It leads to insensitivity to change in exposure compared with the REM model. The present study indicated a need for information about the effects of keeping interpersonal distance and about the importance of virus carrying aerosols in environments with insufficient air ventilation. Longer conversations emitting aerosols in a closed environment may lead to ambient concentrations of aerosols in the air that no distance can compensate for. The results of the study are important for risk communications in countries where people do not wear a mask and when authorities consider removal of a recommendation or a requirement to wear a face mask.
42.	Svenson, O, et al. (author) Without a mask: Judgments of Corona virus exposure as a function of inter personal distance 2020 In: JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING. - 1930-2975. ; 15:6, s. 881-888 Journal article (other academic/artistic)
43.	Västfjäll, Daniel, 1975, et al. (author) Affect, risk perception and future optimism after the tsunami disaster 2008 In: JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING JOURNAL. - 1930-2975. ; 3:1, s. 64-72 Journal article (peer-reviewed)
44.	Wiss, Johanna, et al. (author) The influence of identifiability and singularity in moral decision making 2015 In: Judgment and Decision Making. - 1930-2975. ; 10:5, s. 492-502 Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract There is an increased willingness to help identified individuals rather than non-identified, and the effect of identifiability is mainly present when a single individual rather than a group is presented. However, identifiability and singularity effects have thus far not been manipulated orthogonally. The present research uses a joint evaluation approach to examine the relative contribution of identifiability and singularity in moral decision-making reflecting conflicting values between deontology and consequentialism. As in trolley dilemmas subjects could either choose to stay with the default option, i.e., giving a potentially life-saving vaccine to a single child, or to actively choose to deny the single child the vaccine in favor of five other children. Identifiability of the single child and the group of children was varied between-subjects in a 2x2 factorial design. In total 1,232 subjects from Sweden and the United States participated in three separate experiments. Across all treatments, in all three experiments, 32.6% of the subjects chose to stay with the deontological default option instead of actively choosing to maximize benefits. Results show that identifiability does not always have a positive effect on decisions in allocation dilemmas. For single targets, identifiability had a negative or no effect in two out of three experiments, while for the group of targets identifiability had a more stable positive effect on subjects’ willingness to allocate vaccines. When the effect of identifiability was negative, process data showed that this effect was mediated by emotional reactance. Hence, the results show that the influence of identifiability is more complex than it has been previously portrayed in the literature on charitable giving.

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