| 1. |
- Brandstedt, Eric
(författare)
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The Savings Problem in the Original Position : Assessing and Revising a Model
- 2017
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Ingår i: Canadian Journal of Philosophy. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 1911-0820 .- 0045-5091. ; 47:2-3, s. 269-289
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The common conception of justice as reciprocity seemingly is inapplicable to relations between non-overlapping generations. This is a challenge also to John Rawls’s theory of justice as fairness. This text responds to this by way of reinterpreting and developing Rawls’s theory. First, by examining the original position as a model, some revisions of it are shown to be wanting. Second, by drawing on the methodology of constructivism, an alternative solution is proposed: an amendment to the primary goods named ‘sustainability of values’. This revised original position lends support to intergenerational justice as fairness.
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| 2. |
- Hattiangadi, Anandi, 1973-
(författare)
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Moral Supervenience
- 2018
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Ingår i: Canadian journal of philosophy. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 0045-5091 .- 1911-0820. ; 48:3-4, s. 592-615
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It is widely held, even among nonnaturalists, that the moral supervenes on the natural. This is to say that for any two metaphysically possible worlds w and w′, and for any entities x in w and y in w′, any isomorphism between x and y that preserves the natural properties preserves the moral properties. In this paper, I put forward a conceivability argument against moral supervenience, assuming non-naturalism. First, I argue that though utilitarianism may be true, and the trolley driver is permitted to kill the one to save the five, there is a conceivable scenario that is just like our world in all natural respects, yet at which deontology is true, and the trolly driver is not permitted to kill the one to save the five. I then argue that in the special case of morality, it is possible to infer from the conceivability of such a scenario to its possibility. It follows that supervenience is false.
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| 3. |
- Matheson, Benjamin
(författare)
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Towards a structural ownership condition on moral responsibility
- 2019
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Ingår i: Canadian journal of philosophy. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 0045-5091 .- 1911-0820. ; 49:4, s. 458-480
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper, I propose and defend a structural ownership condition on moral responsibility. According to the condition I propose, an agent owns a mental item if and only if it is part of or is partly grounded by a coherent set of psychological states. As I discuss, other theorists have proposed or alluded to conditions like psychological coherence, but each proposal is unsatisfactory in some way. My account appeals to narrative explanation to elucidate the relevant sense of psychological coherence.
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| 4. |
- Milam, Per-Erik, 1982
(författare)
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Reactive attitudes and personal relationships
- 2016
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Ingår i: Canadian Journal of Philosophy. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 0045-5091 .- 1911-0820. ; 46:1, s. 102-122
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Abolitionism is the view that if no one is responsible, we ought to abandon the reactive attitudes. This paper defends abolitionism against the claim, made by P.F. Strawson and others, that abandoning these attitudes precludes the formation and maintenance of valuable personal relationships. These anti-abolitionists claim (a) that one who abandons the reactive attitudes is unable to take personally others' attitudes and actions regarding her, and (b) that taking personally is necessary for certain valuable relationships. I dispute both claims and argue that this objection exaggerates the role of the reactive attitudes and underestimates the importance of non-reactive moral emotions.
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