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| 2. |
- Agell, Jonas, et al.
(författare)
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Asset Markets, Tax Arbitrage, and the Redistributive Properties of Progressive Income Taxation
- 1988
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- It is commonly believed that tax arbitrage is anti-egalitarian. The present paper shows that this is not necessarily true; tax arbitrage might actually reduce inequality as well as increase efficiency. It is also shown that the introduction of tax arbitrage will linearize the tax system. Thus complicated, non-linear tax scedules in the spirit of Mirrlees (1971) cannot be sustained.
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| 4. |
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| 5. |
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| 6. |
- Flam, Harry, et al.
(författare)
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When Bad Quality is Good Policy
- 1987
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We investigate product quality under different market forms (monopoly vs. perfect competition) and under different risk-sharing regimes (replacement warranty vs. no warranty). Because of our particular representation of quality we can determine optimal quality and optimal risk-sharing within one single model. Quality differes between risk-sharing regimes and not between market forms, but the market form determines optimal risk-sharing and therefore optimal quality. it can be optimal to place all risk with the risk-averse consumer instead of with the risk-neutral prducer(s). Given the market form, the risk-sharing regime that is optimal for the producer(s) is also optimal for the consumers.
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| 7. |
- Persson, Mats
(författare)
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Textilindustrins arbetarbostäder
- 1988
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Ingår i: Bebyggelsehistorisk tidskrift. - : Föreningen Bebyggelsehistorisk tidskrift. - 0349-2834 .- 2002-3812. ; :15, s. 113-128
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 8. |
- Persson, Mats
(författare)
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Voting over the Size of Government
- 1985
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper studies the provision of a public good from three points of view: (i) The maximum level of production of the public good consistent with a Pareto optimum, (ii) The level of production of the good maximizing a social welfare function, and (iii) The level of production of the public good that will be the result of a democratic system with majority voting. The paper analyzes how these three levels of production differ from each other.
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