| 1. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-, et al.
(författare)
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Against the Being For Account of Normative Certitude
- 2012
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Ingår i: Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. - : Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy. - 1559-3061. ; 6:2
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Just as we can be more or less certain about empirical matters, we can be more or less certain about normative matters. Recently, it has been argued that this is a challenge for noncognitivism about normativity. Michael Smith presented the challenge in a 2002 paper and James Lenman (2003) and Michael Ridge (2003, 2007) responded independently. Andrew Sepielli (forthcoming) has now joined the rescue operation. His basic idea is that noncognitivists should employ the notion of being for (Schroeder 2008) to account for normative certitude. We shall argue that the being for account of normative certitude is vulnerable to many problems shared by other noncognitivist theories. Furthermore, we shall argue that Sepielli’s account has its own problems: His favored normalization procedure for degrees of being for has highly problematic implications.
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| 2. |
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| 3. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Adam Smith av Bo Sandelin
- 2011
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Ingår i: Tidskrift för politisk filosofi. - 1402-2710 .- 2002-3383. ; 15:1, s. 51-57
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Recension (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 4. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Buck-Passing Accounts
- 2013
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Ingår i: The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. - Chichester : Wiley-Blackwell. - 9781405186414 - 9781444367072 ; , s. 625-636
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It is a common view that there is an intimate tie between evaluative properties like goodness, badness, and betterness and appropriate responses to bearers of such properties. For instance, if an object is good there are reasons to favor it, or as some say, a favorable response would be fitting. Similarly, many people take there to be a close tie between deontic properties like rightness and wrongness and appropriate responses: if an action is wrong, there are reasons to respond disfavorably, e.g., to blame agents for performing actions of that type. According to buck‐passing accounts (henceforth BPA), evaluative and deontic properties do not themselves provide reasons for responses. Rather, reasons to respond in various ways are provided by good‐, bad‐, better‐, right‐, and wrong‐making properties.
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| 5. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Error theory and reasons for belief
- 2011
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Ingår i: Reasons for belief. - Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. - 9781107006874 - 9781139042703 ; , s. 75-93
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)
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| 6. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-, et al.
(författare)
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Ewing, A. C.
- 2013
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Ingår i: The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. - Chichester : Wiley-Blackwell. - 9781405186414 - 9781444367072 ; , s. 1817-1823
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- A. C. Ewing (1899–1973) came last in the tradition of British moral philosophers that began with Henry Sidgwick and continued with H. A. Prichard, G. E. Moore, W. D. Ross, and C. D. Broad. Philosophers in this tradition shared a nonnaturalist realist view of moral metaphysics and the nature of moral judgment, but they differed on the relations between normative concepts and on normative ethics. Ewing made substantial contributions to these controversies and anticipated several moves in the contemporary debates as he sought to reconcile putatively incompatible views. Attempts to find conciliatory “middle ways” are a recurring theme in Ewing's work. This essay focuses on three main topics: moral metaphysics and the nature of moral judgment, the relation between intrinsic goodness and ought, and utilitarianism and Rossian deontology. Finally, it describes briefly Ewing's work in other areas of moral philosophy.
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| 7. |
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| 8. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Getting Real about Moral Fictionalism
- 2011
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Ingår i: Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 6. - Oxford : Oxford University Press. - 9780199606382 - 9780199606375 ; , s. 181-204
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)
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| 9. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Hume on Is and Ought, by Pigden Charles R. (ed.)
- 2013
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Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0004-8402 .- 1471-6828. ; 91:4, s. 821-824
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Recension (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 10. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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In Defence Of Moral Error Theory
- 2010
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Ingår i: New Waves in Metaethics. - Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan. - 9780230251618 - 9780230251625 ; , s. 62-84
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)
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| 11. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Metaethics
- 2013
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Ingår i: International Encyclopedia of Ethics. - Chichester : Wiley-Blackwell. - 9781444367072 ; , s. 3219-3235
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Moral philosophers often ask whether abortion is morally permissible, whether the suffering of nonhuman animals is on a par morally with human suffering, and whether an action is morally right if and only if it maximizes happiness. Political philosophers often ask whether persons have inviolable rights to their bodies and whether distributive inequality that benefits the worst off is morally acceptable. These are all examples of first-order moral questions. But such questions are not the business of moral and political philosophers only. First-order moral questions pervade everyday thinking and acting: Is it wrong to eat meat? Ought one to donate more to charities? Is there reason to vote in elections?
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| 12. |
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| 13. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Projectivism and Error in Hume's Ethics
- 2011
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Ingår i: Hume Studies. - : Project Muse. - 0319-7336 .- 1947-9921. ; 37:1, s. 19-42
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This essay argues that while Hume believes both that morality is grounded in our ordinary moral practices, sentiments, and beliefs, and that moral properties are real, he also holds that ordinary moral thinking involves systematically erroneous beliefs about moral properties. These claims, on their face, seem difficult to square with one another but this paper argues that on Hume’s view, they are reconcilable. The reconciliation is effected by making a distinction between Hume’s descriptive metaethics, that is, his account of vulgar moral thought and discourse, and his revisionary metaethics, that is, his account of how vulgar moral thought and discourse could be reformed so as to no longer involve error. This essay concludes that Hume is a projectivist and an error theorist in descriptive metaethics, while he is a projectivist and a subjectivist in revisionary metaethics.
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| 14. |
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| 15. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Rationalism vs. Sentimentalism : Reviewing Price's Review
- 2014
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Ingår i: Philosophical Papers. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0556-8641 .- 1996-8523. ; 43:3, s. 429-445
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper revisits Richard Price’s Review of the Principal Questions in Morals (1757/1787). Price was a defender of rationalism about ethics and he anticipated many views and arguments that became influential as the metaethical and ethical debates evolved over the later centuries. The paper explores and assesses Price’s arguments in favour of rationalism and against sentimentalism, with a view to how they bear on the modern metaethical debate.
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| 16. |
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| 17. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Replik om Nozick och rättvisa
- 2014
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Annan publikation (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- I en kolumn på SvD:s ledarsida (21/9) åberopar Andreas Bergh ett känt exempel av filosofen Robert Nozick till försvar för tesen att fördelningar som är resultat av transaktioner som baseras på fria val inte är orättvisa. I Nozicks exempel betalar var och en som vill se basketlegenden Wilt Chamberlain spela en mindre summa pengar till Chamberlain. Eftersom många vill se honom spela blir han mycket rikare än de flesta andra. Detta är inte orättvist, menar Nozick, just eftersom fördelningen är ett resultat av fritt ingångna transaktioner. Bergh menar att historien om Minecraft-skaparen Markus Persson försäljning av spelföretaget Mohjang till Microsoft är en nutida motsvarighet till Nozicks exempel. Bergh ansluter sig till Nozicks libertarianska tes att fördelningar som är resultat av människors fria val inte är orättvisa och menar att detta perspektiv borde anläggas oftare i den svenska debatten.Men det libertarianska perspektivet är långt i från så intuitivt rimligt som Bergh låter påskina. Det är uppenbart att Chamberlain och Persson haft tur. De föddes båda med naturgivna talanger och hade turen att växte upp i sociala miljöer som tillät dem att utveckla talangerna så att de senare kunde slå mynt av dem. Att andra inte haft samma förutsättningar är inte rättvist. Enligt liberala rättviseteorier, t.ex. den som utarbetades av John Rawls, ska en rättvis fördelning kompensera de som inte haft tur i de naturliga och sociala lotterierna. Detta kräver att man beskattar lyckosamma personer som Chamberlain och Persson.Rättvisa fördelningar måste på detta sätt vara ”talang-okänsliga”. En komplikation i de liberala teorierna är att deras förespråkare också brukar kräva att rättvisa fördelningar är ”ambitions-känsliga”: de flitigas ansträngningar ska belönas, samtidigt som de som haft oturen att födas utan inkomstbringande talanger kompenseras. Hur denna avvägning ska göras är en svår fråga. Liberalen Rawls svar var att ojämlikheter bara är rättfärdigade om de leder till att de sämst ställda i samhället får det bättre än de annars skulle haft det. De radikala implikationerna av den tesen är något för svenska folkpartister och andra förmenta liberaler att begrunda.
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| 18. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Skorupski's Middle Way in Metaethics
- 2012
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Ingår i: Philosophy and phenomenological research. - : Wiley. - 0031-8205 .- 1933-1592. ; 85:1, s. 192-200
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 19. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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The Freshman Objection to Expressivism and What to Make of It
- 2010
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Ingår i: Ratio (Oxford. Print). - : Wiley. - 0034-0006 .- 1467-9329. ; 23:1, s. 87-101
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Cognitivism is the view that the primary function of moral judgements is to express beliefs that purport to say how things are; expressivism is the contrasting view that their primary function is to express some desire-like state of mind. I shall consider what I call the freshman objection to expressivism. It is pretty uncontroversial that this objection rests on simple misunderstandings. There are nevertheless interesting metaethical lessons to learn from the fact that the freshman objection is prevalent among undergraduates and non-philosophers. It leaves for expressivists two awkward explanatory tasks. Number one is that of explaining why natural selection – which, by expressivism's own lights, favoured moral thought and talk because of their socially useful regulative and coordinating functions – did not favour a stance that would make moral thought and talk more effective in fulfilling these functions. Number two is that of explaining how moral thought and talk survive in cultural evolution, despite the prevalence of the freshman objection and related worries. I conclude that expressivism as a theory of actual moral discourse rather than a revisionist theory is either false or committed to an implausible error theory, according to which ordinary speakers are systematically mistaken about what they are up to when they make moral judgements.
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| 20. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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The Personal and the Fitting
- 2014
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Ingår i: Journal of Moral Philosophy. - : Brill. - 1740-4681 .- 1745-5243. ; 11:3, s. 341-52
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Forskningsöversikt (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper is a critical notice of a recent significant contribution to the debate about fitting attitudes and value, namely Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen's Personal Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). In this book, Ronnow-Rasmussen seeks to analyse the notion of personal value an instance of the notion of good for a person in terms of fitting attitudes. The paper has three main themes: (i) Rennow-Rasmussen's discussion of general problems for fitting attitude analyses; (ii) his formulation of the fitting attitude analysis of personal value and the notion of 'for someone's sake (FSS) attitudes'; and (iii) his critique of the dichotomy between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons.
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| 21. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
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Thick Concepts, Simon Kirchin (ed.)
- 2013
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Ingår i: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. - 1538-1617.
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Recension (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 22. |
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