1. |
- Olsson, Erik J, et al.
(author)
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Meinen und Entscheiden
- 2004
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In: Logik in der Philosophie. - 3935025661 ; , s. 161-178
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Book chapter (other academic/artistic)
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- Carlson, Erik, et al.
(author)
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Existence, Beneficence, and Design
- 2001
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In: E. Carlson and R. Sliwinski (eds.), Omnium Gatherum, Uppsala, 2001.). ; , s. 79-92
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)
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- Wu, D., et al.
(author)
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A novel strained Si0.7Ge0.3 surface-channel pMOSFET with an ALD TiN/Al2O3/HfAlOx/Al2O3 gate stack
- 2003
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In: IEEE Electron Device Letters. - : Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). - 0741-3106 .- 1558-0563. ; 24:3, s. 171-173
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Proof-of-concept pMOSFETs with a strained-Si0.7Ge0.3 surface-channel deposited by selective epitaxy and a TiN/Al2O3/HfAIO(x)/Al2O3 gate stack grown by atomic layer chemical vapor deposition (ALD) techniques were fabricated. The Si0.7Ge0.3 pMOSFETs exhibited more than 30% higher current drive and peak transconductance than reference Si pMOSFETs with the same gate stack. The effective mobility for the Si reference coincided with the universal hole mobility curve for Si. The presence of a relatively low density of interface states, determined as 3.3x10(11) cm(-2) eV(-1), yielded a subthreshold slope of 75 mV/dec. for the Si reference. For the Si0.7Ge0.3 pMOSFETs, these values were 1.6x10(12) cm(-2) eV(-1) and 110 mV/dec., respectively.
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- Eckert, Jörn, et al.
(author)
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Einleitung
- 2004
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In: Juristische Fakultäten und Juristenausbildung im Ostseeraum: zweiter Rechtshistorikertag im Ostseeraum = Law faculties and legal education in the Baltic sea area: second Conference in Legal History in the Baltic Sea Area. - Uppsala : Kungl. Gustav Adolfs akademien för svensk folkkultur. - 9185190756 ; , s. 13-15, s. 9-12, s. 1-13, s. -357
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Book chapter (other academic/artistic)
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10. |
- Hartig, T., et al.
(author)
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Guest editors' introduction
- 2003
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In: Journal of Environmental Psychology. ; 73:2, s. 165-166
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)
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12. |
- Olsson, Erik J
(author)
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Avoiding Epistemic Hell: Levi on Observation and Inconsistency
- 2003
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In: Synthese. - 0039-7857. ; 135:1, s. 119-140
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Isaac Levi has claimed that our reliance on the testimony of others, and on the testimony of the senses, commonly produces inconsistency in our set of full beliefs. This happens if what is reported is inconsistent with what we believe to be the case. Drawing on a conception of the role of beliefs in inquiry going back to Dewey, Levi has maintained that the inconsistent belief corpus is a state of ``epistemic hell'': it is useless as a basis for inquiry and deliberation. As he has also noticed, the compatibility of these two elements of his pragmatist epistemology could be called into question. For if inconsistency means hell, how can it ever be rational to enter that state, and on what basis could we attempt to regain consistency? Levi, nonetheless, has tried to show that the conflict is only apparent and that no changes of his theory are necessary. In the main part of the paper I argue, by contrast, that his attempts to reconcile these components of his view are unsuccessful.The conflict is real andthus presents a genuine threat to Deweyan pragmatism, as understood by Levi. After an attempt to pinpoint exactly where the source of the problem lies, I explore some possibilities for how to come to grips with it. I conclude that Levi can keep his fundamental thesis concerning the role of beliefs in inquiry and deliberation, provided that he (i) gives up the view that the agent can legitimately escape from inconsistency, and (ii) modifies his account of prediction alias deliberate expansion by acknowledging a third desideratum, besides probability and informational value, namely, not to cause permanent breakdown further down the line of inquiry. The result is a position which is more similar to Peter Gärdenfors's than is Levi's original theory, while retaining the basic insights of the latter.
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13. |
- Olsson, Erik J
(author)
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Belief Revision, Rational Choice and the Unity of Reason
- 2003
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In: Studia Logica. - 1572-8730. ; 73:2, s. 219-240
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Hans Rott has argued, most recently in his book Change, Choice and Inference, that certain formal correspondences between belief revision and rational choice have important philosophical implications, claiming that the former strongly indicate the unity of practical and theoretical reason as well as the primacy of practical reason. In this paper, I confront Rott's argument with three serious challenges. My conclusion is that, while Rott's work is indisputable as a formal achievement, the philosophical consequences he wants to draw are not forthcoming.
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14. |
- Olsson, Erik J, et al.
(author)
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Can we trust our memories? C. I. Lewiss coherence argument
- 2004
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In: Synthese. - 0039-7857. ; 142:1, s. 21-41
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- In this paper we examine C. I. Lewis’s view on the role of coherence – what he calls “congruence” – in the justification of beliefs based on memory or testimony. Lewis has two main theses on the subject. His negative thesis states that coherence of independent items of evidence has no impact on the probability of a conclusion unless each item has some credibility of its own. The positive thesis says, roughly speaking, that coherence of independently obtained items of evidence – such as converging memories or testimonies – raises the probability of a conclusion to the extent sufficient for epistemic justification, or, to use Lewis’s expression, “rational and practical reliance”. It turns out that, while the negative thesis is essentially correct (apart from a slight flaw in Lewis’s account of independence), a strong positive connection between congruence and probability – a connection of the kind Lewis ultimately needs in his validation of memory – is contingent on the Principle of Indifference. In the final section we assess the repercussions of the latter fact for Lewis’s theory in particular and for coherence justification in general.
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15. |
- Olsson, Erik J
(author)
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F. P. Ramsey on Knowledge and Fallibilism
- 2004
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In: Dialectica. - : Verein philosophie.ch. - 1746-8361 .- 0012-2017. ; 58:4, s. 549-557
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- The paper deals mainly with two problems in the epistemology of Frank Plumpton Ramsey. One concerns his account of knowledge, the other his fallibilism. I argue that Ramsey failed to make room for the social aspect of knowledge and, furthermore, that he did not separate the fallibility of our view from its corrigibility. My positive proposal is to combine social reliabilism and corrigibilism with a rejection of fallibilism.
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16. |
- Olsson, Erik J
(author)
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Review of Change, Choice and Inference (Hans Rott, Oxford UP)
- 2004
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In: History and Philosophy of Logic. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0144-5340 .- 1464-5149. ; 25:4, s. 332-334
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Review (other academic/artistic)abstract
- Hans Rott is well-known for his work on belief revision theory in the tradition founded by Carlos Alchourro´ n, Peter Ga¨ rdenfors and David Makinson (hereafter, ‘AGM’) to which he has contributed in a number of fine articles. One of his main achievements is the establishment of far-reaching connections between AGM-style belief revision theory and the classical theory of rational choice, as the latter is understood by mathematical economists like Paul Samuelson and Amartya Sen.
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18. |
- Olsson, Erik J
(author)
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Review of Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge (Hetherington, Oxford UP)
- 2004
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In: Theoria: a Swedish Journal of Philosophy. - 0040-5825. ; 70:1, s. 106-111
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Review (other academic/artistic)abstract
- In this book, Stephen Hetherington attacks what he thinks are two "dogmas" of epistemology. One he calls "epistemic absolutism" which amounts to the claim that knowledge is absolute: you can be with or without it, but once you have it, it is not possible to have more or less. The other is "justificationalism" which is the view that some sort of (internalist of externalist) justification is necessary for knowledge.
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21. |
- Årzén, Karl-Erik, et al.
(author)
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Grafchart for Procedural Operator Support Tasks
- 2002
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In: Proceedings of the 15th Ifac World Congress on the International Federation of Automatic Control: Computers for Control (IFAC Proceedings Volumes). - 0080442277 ; L, s. 85-90
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Conference paper (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Support for procedural operations is important in industry. Within the EU/GROWTH project CHEM aimed at developing advanced decision support systems for the process industry, Grafchart, a toolbox for procedure handling based on Grafcet/Sequential Function Charts, will be used to implement a state-transition support toolbox. A brief overview of Grafchart is given, including a new Java version, JGrafchart. Operator support applications where Grafchart has been used are described.
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