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Optimal unemploymen...
Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctions
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- Boone, Jan (författare)
- Tilburg University, CentER, IZA and CEPR
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- Fredriksson, Peter (författare)
- Uppsala universitet,Nationalekonomiska institutionen
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- Holmlund, Bertil (författare)
- Uppsala universitet,Nationalekonomiska institutionen
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visa fler...
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- van Ours, Jan C. (författare)
- Tilburg University, CentER, IZA and CEPR
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visa färre...
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(creator_code:org_t)
- 2007-04-05
- 2007
- Engelska.
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Ingår i: Economic Journal. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0013-0133 .- 1468-0297. ; 117:518, s. 399-421
- Relaterad länk:
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https://econpapers.r...
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https://urn.kb.se/re...
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https://doi.org/10.1...
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Abstract
Ämnesord
Stäng
- This article analyses the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient. We find that introducing monitoring and sanctions represents a welfare improvement for reasonable estimates of monitoring costs; this conclusion holds both relative to a system featuring indefinite payments of benefits and a system with a time limit on unemployment benefit receipt.
Ämnesord
- SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP -- Ekonomi och näringsliv -- Nationalekonomi (hsv//swe)
- SOCIAL SCIENCES -- Economics and Business -- Economics (hsv//eng)
Nyckelord
- Economics
- Nationalekonomi
- Nationalekonomi
- Economics
Publikations- och innehållstyp
- ref (ämneskategori)
- art (ämneskategori)
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