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Enforcement of Exog...
Enforcement of Exogenous Environmental Regulations, Social Disapproval, and Bribery
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Akpalu, Wisdom, 1968 (author)
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- Eggert, Håkan, 1961 (author)
- Gothenburg University,Göteborgs universitet,Institutionen för nationalekonomi med statistik, Enheten för miljöekonomi,Department of Economics, Environmental Economics Unit
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- Vondolia, Godwin Kofi, 1976 (author)
- Gothenburg University,Göteborgs universitet,Institutionen för nationalekonomi med statistik, Enheten för miljöekonomi,Department of Economics, Environmental Economics Unit
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(creator_code:org_t)
- Göteborg : University of Gothenburg, 2009
- English.
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Series: Working Papers in Economics (online), 1403-2465 ; 392
- Related links:
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https://gup.ub.gu.se...
Abstract
Subject headings
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- Many resource users are not directly involved in the formulation and enforcement of resource management rules and regulations in developing countries. As a result, resource users do not generally accept such rules. Enforcement officers who have social ties to the resource users may encounter social disapproval and possible social exclusion from the resource users if they enforce regulations zealously. The officers, however, may avoid this social disapproval by accepting bribes. In this paper, we present a simple model that characterizes this situation and derives results for situations where officers are passively and actively involved in the bribery.
Subject headings
- SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP -- Ekonomi och näringsliv -- Nationalekonomi (hsv//swe)
- SOCIAL SCIENCES -- Economics and Business -- Economics (hsv//eng)
Keyword
- Natural resource management
- bribery
- law enforcement
- social exclusion
Publication and Content Type
- vet (subject category)
- rap (subject category)
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