Complex Ownership Structures and Corporate Valuations / Luc Laeven.

• The bulk of corporate governance theory examines the agency problems that arise from two extreme ownership structures: 100 percent small shareholders or one large, controlling owner combined with small shareholders. In this paper, we question the empirical validity of this dichotomy. In fact, one-third of publicly listed firms in Europe have multiple large owners, and the market value of firms with multiple blockholders differs from firms with a single large owner and from widely-held firms. Moreover, the relationship between corporate valuations and the distribution of cash-flow rights across multiple large owners is consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical models.

Ämnesord

Blockholders  (imf)

Corporate Valuations  (imf)

Dummy Variable  (imf)

Large Shareholders  (imf)

Shareholder  (imf)

Shareholders  (imf)

Austria  (imf)

France  (imf)

Ireland  (imf)

Italy  (imf)

United Kingdom  (imf)