Search: WFRF:(Zhang Cong)
> (2010-2014) >
On the effects of d...
-
Zhang, KeweiKTH,Nätverk och systemteknik,Networked Systems Security Group,KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden
(author)
On the effects of distance-decreasing attacks on cryptographically protected GNSS signals
- Article/chapterEnglish2019
Publisher, publication year, extent ...
-
2019-02-19
-
Institute of Navigation,2019
-
printrdacarrier
Numbers
-
LIBRIS-ID:oai:DiVA.org:ri-39683
-
https://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:ri:diva-39683URI
-
https://doi.org/10.33012/2019.16736DOI
-
https://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:kth:diva-248026URI
Supplementary language notes
-
Language:English
-
Summary in:English
Part of subdatabase
Classification
-
Subject category:ref swepub-contenttype
-
Subject category:kon swepub-publicationtype
Notes
-
Funding details: Stiftelsen för Strategisk Forskning, SSF; Funding text 1: This work has been partially supported by the Swedish Foundation for Strategic Research (SSF) SURPRISE project.
-
QC 20190412
-
The security of global navigation satellite systems draws attention increasingly, and authentication mechanisms for civilian services seem very effective in thwarting malicious behavior. For example, the Galileo E1 Open Service introduces navigation message authentication. Authentication, as well as encryption at navigation message or spreading code level, can prevent spoofing attacks, but do not preclude replay attacks. In this work, we consider a type of strong replay attacks, distance-decreasing attacks, against cryptographically protected GNSS signals. Distance-decreasing attack enhance an attacker's capability of allowing it to mislead the victim receiver that the GNSS signals arrive earlier than true signals. We analyze the instantiation and the effects of the distance-decreasing attacks on unprotected GNSS signals, on navigation message authenticated signals, and on spreading-code encrypted signals. We discuss different strategies that the attacker can adopt to introduce the least bit errors to the re-transmitted signals and avoid being detected at the victim receiver. We provide evaluation results of distance-decreasing attacks on unprotected signals and authenticated navigation message signals, based on different strategies and configurations, and we sketch countermeasures to the different strategies.
Subject headings and genre
-
Distance-decreasing (DD) attacks
-
Early detection (ED)
-
Late commit (LC)
-
Navigation message authentication (NMA)
-
Spreading code encryption (SCE)
-
Authentication
-
Codes (symbols)
-
Cryptography
-
Navigation
-
Navigation messages
-
Spreading codes
-
Global positioning system
-
Electrical Engineering
Added entries (persons, corporate bodies, meetings, titles ...)
-
Papadimitratos, PanosRISE,SICS,KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden
(author)
-
Papadimitratos, PanagiotisKTH,Nätverk och systemteknik(Swepub:kth)u1ysvc1i
(author)
-
KTHNätverk och systemteknik
(creator_code:org_t)
Related titles
-
In:ION 2019 International Technical Meeting Proceedings: Institute of Navigation, s. 363-372, s. 363-37209364062169780936406213
-
In:Proceedings of the 2019 International Technical Meeting of The Institute of Navigation: Institute of Navigation, s. 363-372, s. 363-372
Internet link
Find in a library
To the university's database