Two-period pricing and quick response with strategic customers

• This research examines the impact of the strategic customer behavior in two-period pricing and the inventory decisions in a quick response system. A model with a differentiated value period of product is developed when customers are strategic and heterogeneous. Interestingly, the unique equilibrium is proven to exist if and only if the degree of customer strategic behavior is sufficiently high. Otherwise, the dynamic pricing strategy in one selling season is not a suitable choice for a firm. Moreover, the impact of strategic consumers on pricing and inventory strategies is investigated in the case where the clientele's taste for product value follows a uniform distribution. Surprisingly, contrary to previous studies, we found that strategic consumers may yield more revenues in specific scenarios. An extended analysis on Beta distribution is also presented, showing that there is greater chance to obtain the highest profit in the supply chain when all customers are strategic and if more people prefer low-value products.

Ämnesord

TEKNIK OCH TEKNOLOGIER  -- Annan teknik (hsv//swe)

ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY  -- Other Engineering and Technologies (hsv//eng)

SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP  -- Ekonomi och näringsliv (hsv//swe)

SOCIAL SCIENCES  -- Economics and Business (hsv//eng)

Nyckelord

Strategic customer

Quick response

Game theory

Inventory and dynamic pricing decisions

Publikations- och innehållstyp

ref (ämneskategori)

art (ämneskategori)