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Can the Normic de m...
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Lundgren, Björn,1984-Stockholms universitet,Filosofiska institutionen,Utrecht University, The Netherlands; Institute for Futures Studies, Sweden
(author)
Can the Normic de minimis Expected Utility Theory save the de minimis Principle?
- Article/chapterEnglish2023
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2023
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2023
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LIBRIS-ID:oai:DiVA.org:su-224594
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https://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:su:diva-224594URI
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https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00751-xDOI
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Language:English
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Summary in:English
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Subject category:ref swepub-contenttype
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Subject category:art swepub-publicationtype
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Recently, Martin Smith defended a view he called the “normic de minimis expected utility theory”. The basic idea is to integrate a ‘normic’ version of the de minimis principle into an expected utility-based decision theoretical framework. According to the de minimis principle some risks are so small (falling below a threshold) that they can be ignored. While this threshold standardly is defined in terms of some probability, the normic conception of de minimis defines this threshold in terms of abnormality. In this article, we present three independent arguments against the normic de minimis expected utility theory, focusing on its reliance on the de minimis principle.
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Stefánsson, H. Orri,1983-Stockholms universitet,Filosofiska institutionen,Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study, Sweden; Institute for Futures Studies, Sweden(Swepub:su)ostef
(author)
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Stockholms universitetFilosofiska institutionen
(creator_code:org_t)
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In:Erkenntnis0165-01061572-8420
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