Optimal Expected Rank in a Two-Sided Secretary Problem

• In a two-sided version of the famous secretary problem, employers search for a secretary at the same time as secretaries search for an employer. Nobody accepts being put on hold, and nobody is willing to take part in more than N interviews. Preferences are independent, and agents seek to optimize the expected rank of the partner they obtain among the N potential partners. We find that in any subgame perfect equilibrium, the expected rank grows as the square root of N (whereas it tends to a constant in the original secretary problem). We also compute how much agents can gain by cooperation.

Ämnesord

NATURVETENSKAP  -- Matematik -- Beräkningsmatematik (hsv//swe)

NATURAL SCIENCES  -- Mathematics -- Computational Mathematics (hsv//eng)

NATURVETENSKAP  -- Matematik -- Diskret matematik (hsv//swe)

NATURAL SCIENCES  -- Mathematics -- Discrete Mathematics (hsv//eng)

Nyckelord

games/group decisions

strategic secretary problem

dynamic programming/optimal control

optimal stopping

Optimization, systems theory

Optimeringslära, systemteori

Publikations- och innehållstyp

ref (ämneskategori)

art (ämneskategori)