The Puzzle of Dogmatism Repuzzled

• Harman and Lewis credit Kripke with having formulated a puzzle that seems to show that knowledge entails dogmatism. The puzzle is widely regarded as having been solved. In this paper we argue that this standard solution, in its various versions, addresses only a limited aspect of the puzzle and holds no promise of fully resolving it. Analyzing this failure and the proper rendering of the puzzle, it is suggested that it poses a significant challenge for the defense of epistemic closure.

Subject headings

HUMANIORA  -- Filosofi, etik och religion -- Filosofi (hsv//swe)

HUMANITIES  -- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion -- Philosophy (hsv//eng)

Keyword

Principle of epistemic closure

Dogmatism

Gettier counter examples

Evidence

Kripke

Harman

Sorensen

Hawthorne.

Theoretical philosophy

Teoretisk filosofi

Publication and Content Type

ref (subject category)

art (subject category)