Rescuing Doxastic Normativism

• According to doxastic normativism, part of what makes an attitude a belief rather than another type of attitude is that it is governed by a truth-norm. It has been objected that this view fails since there are true propositions such that if you believed them they would not be true, and thus the obligation to believe true propositions cannot hold for these. I argue that the solution for doxastic normativists is to find a norm that draws the right distinction between those true propositions we are obliged to believe (ordinary non-tricky propositions) and those we are not (tricky propositions). I develop a norm which I argue does exactly this, and further argue that it can be used to salvage the idea that belief is constitutively normative.

Ämnesord

HUMANIORA  -- Filosofi, etik och religion -- Filosofi (hsv//swe)

HUMANITIES  -- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion -- Philosophy (hsv//eng)

Nyckelord

belief

normativity

doxastic normativism

Publikations- och innehållstyp

ref (ämneskategori)

art (ämneskategori)