On the Provision of Public Goods with Probabilistic and Ambiguous Thresholds

• Many natural systems involve thresholds that, once triggered, imply irreversible damages for the users. Although the existence of such thresholds is undisputed, their location is highly uncertain. We explore experimentally how threshold uncertainty affects collective action in a series of threshold public goods games. Whereas the public good is always provided when the exact value of the threshold is known, threshold uncertainty is generally detrimental for the public good provision as contributions become more erratic. The negative effect of threshold uncertainty is particularly severe when it takes the form of ambiguity, i.e. when players are not only unaware of the value of the threshold, but also of its probability distribution. Early and credible commitment helps groups to cope with uncertainty.

Subject headings

SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP  -- Ekonomi och näringsliv (hsv//swe)

SOCIAL SCIENCES  -- Economics and Business (hsv//eng)

Keyword

Cooperation

Experiment

Public good

Threshold uncertainty

Ambiguity

CLIMATE-CHANGE

VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS

COLLECTIVE ACTION

TIPPING

POINTS

SOCIAL DILEMMA

UNCERTAINTY

RISK

COMMUNICATION

ADAPTATION

PRIVATE

Economics

Environmental Studies

ATES OF AMERICA

V105

P1786

ATES OF AMERICA

V108

P11825

EN XP

1994

ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES

V60

P367

ATES OF AMERICA

V105

P2291

Publication and Content Type

ref (subject category)

art (subject category)