Intentional cooperation and acting as part of a single body

Blomberg, Olle,1978University of Gothenburg,Lund University,Lunds universitet,Gothenburg University,Göteborgs universitet,Institutionen för filosofi, lingvistik och vetenskapsteori,Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science,Metaphysics and Collectivity,Forskargrupper vid Lunds universitet,Praktisk filosofi,Filosofiska institutionen,Institutioner,Humanistiska och teologiska fakulteterna,Lund University Research Groups,Practical Philosophy,Departments,Joint Faculties of Humanities and Theology (författare)

According to some accounts, an individual participates in joint intentional cooperative action by virtue of conceiving of himself or herself and other participants as if they were parts of a single agent or body that performs the action. I argue that this notional singularization move fails if they act as if they were parts of a single agent. It can succeed, however, if the participants act as if to bring about the goal of a properly functioning single body in action of which they would be parts. This latter version of the move manages to capture the cooperative character of joint intentional cooperative action, and does this without requiring of participants that they act on higher‐order interlocking intentions.

Göteborgs universitetInstitutionen för filosofi, lingvistik och vetenskapsteori (creator_code:org_t)

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