AI and Spinoza: a review of law's conceptual treatment of lethal autonomous weapons systems

De Lucia Dahlbeck, Moa,1981Gothenburg University,Göteborgs universitet,Juridiska institutionen,Department of Law (author)

In this article I will argue that the philosophy of Benedict Spinoza (1632–1677) may assist us in coming to terms with some of the conceptual challenges that the phenomenon of Artificial Intelligence (AI) poses on law and legal thought. I will pursue this argument in three steps. First, I will suggest that Spinoza’s philosophy of the mind and knowledge may function as an analytical tool for making sense of the prevailing conception of AI within the legal discourse on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS). Then, I will continue the argument with the aid of Spinoza’s political philosophy which partly complicates the picture as it seems to disqualify a normative process grounded directly upon the means stipulated for achieving a robust understanding of AI. Based on these two separate discussions I will conclude by outlining a composite critique – from the twofolded perspective of Spinoza’s ethical and political discussions – of the ongoing negotiations of a new Conventional Weapons Convention (CCW) protocol on LAWS.

HUMANIORA Filosofi, etik och religion hsv//swe
HUMANITIES Philosophy, Ethics and Religion hsv//eng
SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP Juridik hsv//swe
SOCIAL SCIENCES Law hsv//eng
SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP Annan samhällsvetenskap hsv//swe
SOCIAL SCIENCES Other Social Sciences hsv//eng
Intelligence · AI · Spinoza’s philosophy of the mind and knowledge · Ethics · International humanitarian law · lethal autonomous weapons systems

In:AI & Society: Journal of Knowledge, Culture and Communication: Springer Science and Business Media LLC36, s. 797-8050951-56661435-5655

About the subject

Kungliga biblioteket hanterar dina personuppgifter i enlighet med EU:s dataskyddsförordning (2018), GDPR. Läs mer om hur det funkar här.
Så här hanterar KB dina uppgifter vid användning av denna tjänst.