Technology Transfers, Efficiency Gains and Surplus Thresholds:An Aggregate Equilibrium Approach Analysis

• We illustrate how an aggregate equilibrium approach can be applied to analyze the efficiency gains and social welfare effects of transfers of sufficiently large, but nondrastic, technological innovations among firms in an industry characterized by diseconomies of scale. In particular, we demonstrate how the approach can be used to identify a range of intermediate cost differences between firms where technology transfer through collusion will be optimal for competing firms and the society, including thresholds for when consumers will be indifferent to whether firms in an industry compete or collude. In addition, we discuss how a per-unit royalty license fee, which is partly paid upfront for a minimum required quantity, can be used by the licensor to restrict the quantity output of the licensee(s), and ensure the stability of collusion. We suggest that this licensing contract, which has implications for policymakers and practitioners, may explain why technology transfers often occur in highly technological industries among otherwise competing firms with market power.

Ämnesord

SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP  -- Ekonomi och näringsliv (hsv//swe)

SOCIAL SCIENCES  -- Economics and Business (hsv//eng)

Nyckelord

Aggregate equilibrium approach

technology transfer

licensing

competition

collusion

diseconomies of scale

Publikations- och innehållstyp

ref (ämneskategori)

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