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  • Blomberg, OlleGothenburg University,Göteborgs universitet,Lund University,Lunds universitet,Metaphysics and Collectivity,Forskargrupper vid Lunds universitet,Praktisk filosofi,Filosofiska institutionen,Institutioner,Humanistiska och teologiska fakulteterna,Lund University Research Groups,Practical Philosophy,Department of Philosophy,Departments,Joint Faculties of Humanities and Theology,Institutionen för filosofi, lingvistik och vetenskapsteori,Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science (author)

Team reasoning and collective moral obligation

  • Article/chapterEnglish2024

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  • Philosophy Documentation Center,2024

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  • LIBRIS-ID:oai:lup.lub.lu.se:1c557c36-2758-4ab2-8ee0-eb4f9b2afbda
  • https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/1c557c36-2758-4ab2-8ee0-eb4f9b2afbdaURI
  • https://doi.org/10.5840/soctheorpract2023120177DOI
  • https://gup.ub.gu.se/publication/313876URI

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  • Language:English
  • Summary in:English &Swedish

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  • Subject category:ref swepub-contenttype

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  • We propose a new account of collective moral obligation. We argue that several agents have a moral obligation together only if they each have (i) a context-specific capacity to view their situation from the group’s perspective, and (ii) at least a general capacity to deliberate about what they ought to do together. Such an obligation is irreducibly collective, in that it doesn’t imply that the individuals have any obligations to contribute to what is required of the group. We highlight various distinctive features of our account. One such feature is that moral obligations are always relative to an agential perspective.
  • We propose a new account of collective moral obligation. We argue that several agents can only have a moral obligation together if they each have (i) a context-specific capacity to regard their situation from the group’s perspective and (ii) at least a general capacity to deliberate about what they ought to do together. Such an obligation is irreducibly collective in that it doesn’t imply that the individuals have obligations to contribute to what is required of the group. We highlight distinct features of our account. One such feature is that moral obligations are always relative to an assumed agential perspective.

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  • Petersson, BjörnLund University,Lunds universitet,Metaphysics and Collectivity,Forskargrupper vid Lunds universitet,Praktisk filosofi,Filosofiska institutionen,Institutioner,Humanistiska och teologiska fakulteterna,Lund University Research Groups,Practical Philosophy,Department of Philosophy,Departments,Joint Faculties of Humanities and Theology(Swepub:lu)fil-bpe (author)
  • Metaphysics and CollectivityForskargrupper vid Lunds universitet (creator_code:org_t)

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  • In:Social Theory and Practice: Philosophy Documentation Center0037-802X

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By the author/editor
Blomberg, Olle
Petersson, Björn
About the subject
HUMANITIES
HUMANITIES
and Philosophy Ethic ...
and Philosophy
HUMANITIES
HUMANITIES
and Philosophy Ethic ...
and Ethics
SOCIAL SCIENCES
SOCIAL SCIENCES
and Sociology
and Social Psycholog ...
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Social Theory an ...
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Lund University
University of Gothenburg

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