Responsibility of Action and Situated Cognition in Artefact—User Relationship

• I discuss the dilution of responsibility of action and the idea of a symmetrical relationship between artefacts and humans. In doing so, I argue that meaning making is an activity unilaterally performed by agents, leading to an asymmetrical relationship between agents and artefacts. Therefore, the study of the one who is responsible for the action, the meaning-maker (with the capability to act) is crucial for a theory of action responsibility. The latter should not be transferred to derived agents, an abstract brand or impersonal technologies. The study of the origin of actions is crucial for a better understanding of situated cognition in relation to responsibility. Therefore, the role of artefacts in human actions has to be reconsidered, since artefacts acquire functions by means of designing and they do not act for themselves. These issues have consequences for our understanding of situated cognition and for the current debate on responsibility of AI technologies, as well as for work analysis and design.

Subject headings

HUMANIORA  -- Annan humaniora -- Övrig annan humaniora (hsv//swe)

HUMANITIES  -- Other Humanities -- Other Humanities not elsewhere specified (hsv//eng)

Keyword

Agency

Artefact—user relationship

Cognitive semiotics

Situated cognition

Publication and Content Type

kon (subject category)

ref (subject category)