Metaethical Contextualism Defended

Björnsson, Gunnar, 1969 (author): Linköpings universitet,Gothenburg University,Göteborgs universitet,Institutionen för filosofi, lingvistik och vetenskapsteori,Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science,Avdelningen för kulturvetenskaper, KVA,Filosofiska fakulteten

Finlay, Stephen (author): School of Philosophy, University of Southern California

(creator_code:org_t)

University of Chicago Press, 2010
2010
English.
In: Ethics. - : University of Chicago Press. - 0014-1704 .- 1539-297X. ; 121:1, s. 7-36

Related links:: https://gup.ub.gu.se...; show more...; https://urn.kb.se/re...; https://doi.org/10.1...; show less...

Abstract Subject headings

We defend a contextualist account of normative judgments as relativized both to (i) information and to (ii) standards or ends against recent objections that turn on practices of normative disagreement. Niko Kolodny and John MacFarlane argue that information-relative contextualism cannot accommodate the connection between deliberation and advice. In response, we suggest that they misidentify the basic concerns of deliberating agents, which are not to settle the truth of particular propositions but to promote certain values. For pragmatic reasons, semantic assessments of normative claims sometimes are evaluations of propositions other than those asserted. Other writers have raised parallel objections to standard-relative contextualism, particularly about moral claims; we argue for a parallel solution

About the subject

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