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Weakly Fair Allocat...
Weakly Fair Allocations and Strategy-Proofness
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- Andersson, Tommy (author)
- Lund University,Lunds universitet,Nationalekonomiska institutionen,Ekonomihögskolan,Department of Economics,Lund University School of Economics and Management, LUSEM
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(creator_code:org_t)
- 2008
- 2008
- English.
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In: Review of Economic Design. - 1434-4742. ; 11, s. 321-338
- Related links:
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https://lup.lub.lu.s...
Abstract
Subject headings
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- This paper investigates the problem of allocating two types of indivisible objects among a group of agents when a priority-order must be respected and only restricted monetary transfers are allowed. Since the existence of a fair (as in envy-free) allocation is not generally guaranteed, due to the restrictions on the money transfers, the concept of fairness is weakened, and a new concept of fairness is introduced. This concept is called weak fairness. This paper defines an allocation rule that implements weakly fair allocations and demonstrates that it is coalitionally strategy-proof. In fact, under a mild regulatory condition and quasi-linear utility functions, it is demonstrated that this is the only coalitionally strategy-proof allocation rule that implements a weakly fair allocation.
Subject headings
- SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP -- Ekonomi och näringsliv -- Nationalekonomi (hsv//swe)
- SOCIAL SCIENCES -- Economics and Business -- Economics (hsv//eng)
Keyword
- Indivisibles
- fairness
- weak fairness
- strategy-pr
Publication and Content Type
- art (subject category)
- ref (subject category)
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