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Sökning: onr:"swepub:oai:DiVA.org:uu-425802" > Industry incentives...

LIBRIS Formathandbok  (Information om MARC21)
FältnamnIndikatorerMetadata
00004209naa a2200385 4500
001oai:DiVA.org:uu-425802
003SwePub
008201119s2020 | |||||||||||000 ||eng|
024a https://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-4258022 URI
024a https://doi.org/10.1038/s41429-020-0300-y2 DOI
040 a (SwePub)uu
041 a engb eng
042 9 SwePub
072 7a ref2 swepub-contenttype
072 7a for2 swepub-publicationtype
100a Morel, Chantal M.u Uppsala universitet,Företagsekonomiska institutionen,Univ Geneva Hosp, Rue Gabrielle Perret Gentil 4, CH-1205 Geneva, Switzerland.;Fac Med, Rue Gabrielle Perret Gentil 4, CH-1205 Geneva, Switzerland.;Global Studies Inst, Rue Vieux Grenadiers 10, CH-1205 Geneva, Switzerland.4 aut0 (Swepub:uu)chamo685
2451 0a Industry incentives and antibiotic resistance :b an introduction to the antibiotic susceptibility bonus
264 c 2020-03-19
264 1b NATURE PUBLISHING GROUP,c 2020
338 a electronic2 rdacarrier
520 a The scarcity of novel antibiotic compounds in a time of increasing resistance rates has begun to ring alarm bells at the highest echelons of government. Large new financial incentives to accelerate antibiotic research and development, such as market entry rewards (MERs), are being considered. However, there is little focus on how to sustain the efficacy of new, promising antibiotics reaching the market. Currently, inappropriate use of antibiotics is commonplace, which has accelerated resistance development. In an attempt to halt this trend, antibiotic stewardship policies are being implemented in many resource-rich settings. Unfortunately, this has not yet had an impact on the amount of antibiotics being prescribed globally. One important hurdle is misalignment of incentives. While governments and health services are incentivized to promote prudent use of this common good, pharmaceutical companies are incentivized to increase volume of sales to maximize profits. This problem must be addressed or else the major efforts going into developing new antibiotics will be in vain. In this paper we outline an approach to realign the incentives of pharmaceutical companies with wider antibiotic conservation efforts by making a staged bonus a component of an MER for antibiotic developers when resistance to their drug remains low over time. This bonus could address the lack of stewardship focus in any innovation-geared incentive.
650 7a SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAPx Ekonomi och näringslivx Företagsekonomi0 (SwePub)502022 hsv//swe
650 7a SOCIAL SCIENCESx Economics and Businessx Business Administration0 (SwePub)502022 hsv//eng
700a Lindahl, Olof,d 1982-u Uppsala universitet,Företagsekonomiska institutionen4 aut0 (Swepub:uu)ololi123
700a Harbarth, Stephanu Univ Geneva Hosp, Infect Control Programme, Rue Gabrielle Perret Gentil, CH-41205 Geneva, Switzerland.;Univ Geneva Hosp, Div Infect Dis, Rue Gabrielle Perret Gentil, CH-41205 Geneva, Switzerland.;Fac Med, Rue Gabrielle Perret Gentil, CH-41205 Geneva, Switzerland.;Univ Geneva Hosp, WHO Collaborating Ctr Patient Safety, Rue Gabrielle Perret Gentil, CH-41205 Geneva, Switzerland.4 aut
700a de Kraker, Marlieke E. A.u Univ Geneva Hosp, Rue Gabrielle Perret Gentil 4, CH-1205 Geneva, Switzerland.;Fac Med, Rue Gabrielle Perret Gentil 4, CH-1205 Geneva, Switzerland.4 aut
700a Edwards, Suzanneu Berlin Univ Technol, Dept Hlth Care Management, Berlin, Germany.4 aut
700a Hollis, Aidanu Univ Calgary, Dept Econ, 2500 Univ Dr NW, Calgary, AB T2N 1N4, Canada.4 aut
710a Uppsala universitetb Företagsekonomiska institutionen4 org
773t Journal of antibiotics (Tokyo. 1968)d : NATURE PUBLISHING GROUPg 73:7, s. 421-428q 73:7<421-428x 0021-8820x 1881-1469
856u https://doi.org/10.1038/s41429-020-0300-yy Fulltext
856u https://uu.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1502382/FULLTEXT01.pdfx primaryx Raw objecty fulltext:print
856u https://www.nature.com/articles/s41429-020-0300-y.pdf
8564 8u https://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:uu:diva-425802
8564 8u https://doi.org/10.1038/s41429-020-0300-y

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