Delay-on-Squash : Stopping Microarchitectural Replay Attacks in Their Tracks

• MicroScope and other similar microarchitectural replay attacks take advantage of the characteristics of speculative execution to trap the execution of the victim application in a loop, enabling the attacker to amplify a side-channel attack by executing it indefinitely. Due to the nature of the replay, it can be used to effectively attack software that are shielded against replay, even under conditions where a side-channel attack would not be possible (e.g., in secure enclaves). At the same time, unlike speculative side-channel attacks, microarchitectural replay attacks can be used to amplify the correct path of execution, rendering many existing speculative side-channel defenses ineffective. In this work, we generalize microarchitectural replay attacks beyond MicroScope and present an efficient defense against them. We make the observation that such attacks rely on repeated squashes of so-called "replay handles" and that the instructions causing the side-channel must reside in the same reorder buffer window as the handles. We propose Delay-on-Squash, a hardware-only technique for tracking squashed instructions and preventing them from being replayed by speculative replay handles. Our evaluation shows that it is possible to achieve full security against microarchitectural replay attacks with very modest hardware requirements while still maintaining 97% of the insecure baseline performance.

Ämnesord

NATURVETENSKAP  -- Data- och informationsvetenskap -- Datavetenskap (hsv//swe)

NATURAL SCIENCES  -- Computer and Information Sciences -- Computer Sciences (hsv//eng)

Nyckelord

Microarchitecture

side-channels

security

replay attacks

Publikations- och innehållstyp

ref (ämneskategori)

art (ämneskategori)