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Strategy-proof allo...
Strategy-proof allocation of multiple public goods
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- Svensson, Lars-Gunnar (author)
- Lund University,Lunds universitet,Nationalekonomiska institutionen,Ekonomihögskolan,Department of Economics,Lund University School of Economics and Management, LUSEM
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- Torstensson, Pär (author)
- Lund University,Lunds universitet,Nationalekonomiska institutionen,Ekonomihögskolan,Department of Economics,Lund University School of Economics and Management, LUSEM
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(creator_code:org_t)
- 2007-03-15
- 2008
- English.
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In: Social Choice and Welfare. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0176-1714 .- 1432-217X. ; 30:2, s. 181-196
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http://dx.doi.org/10...
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Abstract
Subject headings
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- This paper characterizes strategy-proof social choice functions (SCFs), the outcome of which are multiple public goods. Feasible alternatives belong to subsets of a product set $${A_{1} imes cdots imes A_{m}}$$ . The SCFs are not necessarily “onto”, but the weaker requirement, that every element in each category of public goods A k is attained at some preference profile, is imposed instead. Admissible preferences are arbitrary rankings of the goods in the various categories, while a separability restriction concerning preferences among the various categories is assumed. It is found that the range of the SCF is uniquely decomposed into a product set $${B_{1} imes cdots imes B_{q},}$$ in general coarser than the original product set, and that the SCF must be dictatorial on each component B l . If the range cannot be decomposed, a form of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem with a restricted preference domain is obtained.
Subject headings
- SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP -- Ekonomi och näringsliv -- Nationalekonomi (hsv//swe)
- SOCIAL SCIENCES -- Economics and Business -- Economics (hsv//eng)
Publication and Content Type
- art (subject category)
- ref (subject category)
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