Charity as income redistribution: a model with optimal taxation, status, and social stigma

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Fältnamn	Indikatorer	Metadata
000		03264nam a2200517 4500
001		oai:DiVA.org:umu-164198
003		SwePub
008		191016s2019 \| \|\|\|\|\|\|\|\|\|\|\|000 \|\|eng\|
009		oai:gup.ub.gu.se/284050
024	7	a 2077/618552 hdl
024	7	a https://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-1641982 URI
024	7	a https://gup.ub.gu.se/publication/2840502 URI
040		a (SwePub)umud (SwePub)gu
041		a engb eng
042		9 SwePub
072	7	a vet2 swepub-contenttype
072	7	a rap2 swepub-publicationtype
100	1	a Aronsson, Thomas,d 1963-u Umeå universitet,Nationalekonomi4 aut0 (Swepub:umu)thar0001
245	1 0	a Charity as income redistribution :b a model with optimal taxation, status, and social stigma
264	1	a Gothenburg :b University of Gothenburg,c 2019
300		a 50 s.
338		a print2 rdacarrier
490	0	a Working Papers in Economics (online),x 1403-2465
520		a In light of the increasing inequality in many countries, this paper analyzes redistributive charitable giving from the rich to the poor in a model of optimal nonlinear income taxation. Our framework integrates (i) public and private redistribution, (ii) the warm glow of giving and stigma of receiving charitable donations, and (iii) status concerns emanating from social comparisons with respect to charitable donations and private consumption. Whether charity should be taxed or supported largely depends on the relative strengths of the warm glow of giving and the stigma of receiving charity, respectively, and on the positional externalities caused by charitable donations. In addition, imposing stigma on the mimicker (which relaxes the self-selection constraint) strengthens the case for subsidizing charity. We also consider a case where the government is unable to target the charitable giving through a direct tax instrument, and we examine how the optimal marginal income tax structure should be adjusted in response to charitable giving. Numerical simulations demonstrate that the quantitative effects of the aforementioned mechanisms can be substantial.
650	7	a SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAPx Ekonomi och näringslivx Nationalekonomi0 (SwePub)502012 hsv//swe
650	7	a SOCIAL SCIENCESx Economics and Businessx Economics0 (SwePub)502012 hsv//eng
653		a conspicuous consumption
653		a conspicuous charitable giving
653		a social status
653		a optimal income taxation
653		a warm glow
653		a stigma
653		a Economics
653		a nationalekonomi
653		a Conspicuous consumption
653		a conspicuous charitable giving
653		a social status
653		a optimal income taxation
653		a warm glow
653		a stigma
700	1	a Johansson-Stenman, Olof,d 1966u Gothenburg University,Göteborgs universitet,Institutionen för nationalekonomi med statistik,Department of Economics4 aut0 (Swepub:gu)xjohol
700	1	a Wendner, Ronald,d 1968-u University of Graz, Österrike4 aut
710	2	a Umeå universitetb Nationalekonomi4 org
856	4	u http://www.usbe.umu.se/ues/ues961.pdfy URL
856	4 8	u https://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:se:umu:diva-164198
856	4 8	u https://gup.ub.gu.se/publication/284050

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