Pricing carbon : a climate coalition as a complement to UN negotiations.

• This paper analyzes insufficiencies in UN negotiations and identifies a set of characteristics that would make a complementary institutional design efficient. A coalition among nations with high climate ambitions is suggested. Such a coalition should introduce measures that leaders can control and be accountable for—measures that are short-term and fewdimensional, and that incentivize efficient reductions, prevent leakages to outside nations, and sanction non-compliance. A coalition should also provide incentives to outside emitters and encourage new members. A Climate Coalition that harmonizes minimum national carbon prices (i.e. carbon taxes), introduces a common carbon tariff, and welcomes new members would meet the criteria and have the potential to emerge at a global level.

Ämnesord

SOCIAL SCIENCES  -- Other Social Sciences (hsv//eng)

SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP  -- Annan samhällsvetenskap (hsv//swe)

Nyckelord

Complementary design

Climate coalition

Carbon price

Carbon tariff

Emergent global carbon price

Civics

Samhällsvetenskap

Publikations- och innehållstyp

vet (ämneskategori)

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